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Abstract 
 
ESSAYS ON SAVINGS BEHAVIOR OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN 
COLOMBIA 
 
by 
 
Luz M. Salas 
 
Advisor: Professor Jonathan Conning 
 
I designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial to study whether relatively 
simple modifications to how a commitment savings product was framed and labeled could 
affect savings accumulations and other outcomes of low-income individuals in newly 
formed Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. Motivated by 
hypotheses from behavioral economics, the experiment tests hypotheses that behavioral 
responses should vary depending on whether subjects are led to label and create ‘mental 
savings accounts’ in private or public ways. Individuals in the private-labeling treatment 
groups were led to label their savings as earmarked for a particular purpose and to state 
savings accumulation targets, information which was shared only privately with a member 
of the research team. Individuals in the public-labeling treatment groups received the same 
intervention but were then asked to publicly reveal and announce their chosen goals to 
other members of their savings group. The average treatment effects of the public-labeling 
 v 
intervention are very strong and significant. Savings accumulations increased by an average 
of 35% and savings goals were 8.5% more likely to be reached in comparison to those 
untreated. Further explorations strongly suggests evidence of differentiated behavioral 
responses of individuals in the private-labeling treatment group: private commitment to a 
savings goal is more effective for individuals who, after random assignment but prior to the 
intervention, had been measured to be less constrained by economic circumstances and 
institutional barriers. The analysis and interpretation of results was enriched by mixed 
methods for data collection: households’ survey data, administrative records and qualitative 
data from focus groups discussions. Chapter 1 described the type of individuals that, being 
offered the option, decide to participate in VSLAs. Chapters 2 and 3 show how the 
interventions affect savings and other behaviors of individuals that participate in the 
interventions.  
 
 
 
 
  
 vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the support of my 
advisors, my friends, The Graduate Center, government and other institutions in Colombia, 
and most importantly my family. In particular, I would like to thank my advisors Dr. 
Jonathan Conning and Dr. Karna Basu; my committee members: Dr. Wim Vijverberg and 
Dr. David Jaeger. The graduate Center’s Doctoral Student Research Grant, the Ministry of 
Social Protection of Colombia and the Multi donor Research Platform on Social Protection 
and Financial Inclusion: “Todas Cuentan” with support from University of Chile, Ford 
Foundation, IDRC – CRDI, FOMIN-IDB, Fundacion Capital and IEP, for financial support 
in the design and implementation of the project; my friends and colleagues who gave me 
useful comments and helped push me across the finish line; friends that believed in the 
project and offered me the opportunity to develop it: German Quiroga from Red Unidos, 
Maria Clara Hoyos and Ursula Borrero from Banca de las Oportunidades, Mauricio 
Santamaria from Ministry of Social Protection; Jaime Villarraga and Carlos Caceres from 
IED/Vital, and Juan Garzon from Plan International. I am grateful with my family: my 
mom Angela, Jaime Ernesto, Angela Maria, Luisa Maria for their encouragement. I 
especially thank my husband Juan for his patience, constant motivation, guidance and love. 
This dissertation would not have been possible without his support. To my Dad, Jaime. 
 
 
 vii 
 
 
 
Contents 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………iv 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..vi 
Contents…………...……………………………………………………………………...vii 
List of Tables……..………………………………………………………………………..vi 
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………...vi 
 
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………..……1 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Literature review…………………………………………………………………….…10 
 
Chapter 3: Who joins VSLAs? 
3.1.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………18 
3.2. Village Savings and Loan Associations………………………………………………20 
3.3. Description of the data………………………………………………………………...23 
3.4. What types of households join a VSLA? …………………………………………..…24 
3.5. Qualitative analysis……………………………………………………………………36 
3.6. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….…40 
 viii 
 
Chapter 4: Private vs. Public Mental Accounts: Experimental Evidence from Savings 
Groups in Colombia 
4.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….…49 
4.2. Microfinance in Colombia…………………………………………………………..57 
4.3. Experimental design…………………………………………………………………61 
4.4. Data collection and sample size…………………………..…………………………66 
4.5. Results…………………………………………………………………………….…69 
4.6. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...88 
 
Chapter 5: Does savings more help people make better choices? Experimental 
evidence from VSLAs in Colombia 
 
5.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..101 
5.2. Does labeling savings accounts stimulate changes in other behaviors?......................104 
5.3. Description of the data and outcome variables……………………………………....104 
5.4. Results………………………………………………………………………………..109 
5.5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………111 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..…114 
 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..…117 
 
 
  
 ix 
 
List of Tables 
 
Chapter 3: 
Table 1: Comparison of the situation of households between the VSLA survey and ELCA 
2010………………………………………………………………………………………...42 
Table 2: Housing…………………………………………………………………………...42 
Table 3: Health and food security………………………………………………………….43 
Table 4: Occupation……………………………………………………………………......43 
Table 5: Performance of businesses………………………………………………………..44 
Table 6: Ownership of assets, durables and animals……………………………………….44 
Table 7: Evidence of discretionary spending………………………………………………44 
Table 8: Common financial difficulties……………………………………………………45 
Table 9: Solutions to financial difficulties…………………………………………………45  
Table 10: Distribution of household in income quintiles…………………………………..45 
Table 11: Savings…………………………………………………………………………..46 
Table 12: Loans…………………………………………………………………………….46 
 
Chapter 4: 
Table 1: Experimental sample……………………………………………………………...91 
Table 2: Power calculations……………………………………………………………......91 
Table 3: Baseline comparison of covariates across experimental groups………………….92 
 x 
Table 4: Savings commitments…………………………………………………………….92 
Table 5: Treatment effects on savings……………………………………………………..93 
Table 6: Interval regression results………………………………………………………...93 
Table 7: Pre- and Post-treatment averages for savings outcomes…..……………………...93 
Table 8: Treatment effects with controls………………………………………………..…94 
Table 9: Heterogeneous treatment effects………………………………………………….94 
Table 10: Total heterogeneous treatment effects…………………………………………..95 
Table 11: Step 1: Ordered probit to estimate the probability of purchasing a discrete number 
of shares in the first meeting……………………………………………………………….95 
Table 12: Step 2: Treatment effects on savings accumulations with and without controls..96 
Table 13: Treatment effects on goal achievement…………………………………………96 
Appendix A1. Treatment effects estimated for each meeting…………………………….100 
 
Chapter 5: 
Table 1: OLS regressions of outcome variables on treatment status……………………..113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xi 
List of Figures 
 
Chapter 3: 
Figure 1: Economic activities of businesses……………………………………………….47 
Figure 2: Household expenditures…………………………………………………………47 
Figure 3: Household income (USD): real and necessary…………………………………..48 
 
Chapter 4: 
Figure 1a: Trend of the number of share purchased over the entire savings cycle………..97 
Figure 1b: Cumulative total savings per meeting by experimental group…………………97 
Figure 2.a: Share prices…………………………………………………………………….98 
Figure 2.b: Shares bought in first meeting…………………………………………………98 
Figure 3: Trends of shares purchased in each meeting by number of shares bought in the 
first meeting………………………………………………………………………………..99 
Figure 4: Total heterogeneous effects on savings………………………………………….99 
 
 
 
  

1	  
 
Chapter 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Savings is important to poor households. Capital and asset accumulation can help 
provide poor and extremely poor households with an improved ability to generate future 
income and more effectively fight poverty in the future, smooth consumption and 
investment plans in the face of adverse shocks.1 Poor households save small amounts of 
cash flows via informal providers such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors; or save by 
holding risky assets (livestock, stored grain, durable goods).2 In all forms of microfinance, 
high costs of monitoring and transaction relative to the size of the financial amounts 
involved have often worked to reduce both the supply and the demand for formal financial 
services or made access costly for clients.3 For this reason, innovations to bring down costs 
and improve the terms and usefulness of services offered to the poor are key to expanding 
service. I design and evaluate two modifications of a well-established methodology of self-
help groups in Colombia called Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA), in order to 
understand if private or public commitment through the creation and salience of ‘mental 
savings accounts’, affects savings behavior. The results show that public commitment is 
very effective in increasing savings and private commitment has heterogeneous behavioral 
responses of treatment effects. 
                                                
1 Karlan and Morduch (2009), and Burgees et al (2005). 
2 Duflo and Banerjee (2007), Dupas and Robinson (2010), Collins et al (2009), Karlan and Murdoch (2009). 
3 Karlan and Morduch, 2009; and Dupas and Robinson (2010). 
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Recent evidence suggests that self-control problems and time inconsistent preferences 
of individuals might prevent them from making optimal decisions in everyday scenarios 
such as waking up early, starting a diet, doing homework, or even saving.4 As a result, 
individuals often demand and rely upon commitment mechanisms to mitigate these 
problems. According to Bryan at el (2010), commitment mechanisms provide individuals 
with tools to help them stick to a plan that might otherwise be repeatedly postponed 
because of a disparity between our long and short run intentions. Frequently, individuals’ 
preferences for future choices are valued disproportionately lower over current ones5 
leading to situations such as clicking the snooze button of the alarm clock or delaying our 
workout one more day. As a result, individuals end up running anxious to catch the last 
train and a lecture from the boss, or having to bear that back pain that have not managed to 
escape from. These situations are common when making financial choices. Consequently, 
savings rates and assets accumulation are often low, and this is not just the result of lack of 
access to formal financial services. A commitment mechanism is something that helps us 
promise our current selves to behave according to our future best interests. In the context of 
under-savings, a commitment device is an arrangement used by individuals to incentivize 
higher savings or penalize failure to making deposits. These rewards or penalties could be 
economic (hard commitment) or psychological (soft commitment). In this study I use a soft 
commitment device to evaluate how individuals respond to self-control problems associated 
to savings decisions.  
This study describes the design and implementation of a Randomized Controlled Trial 
to evaluate if relatively simple modifications to how an existing savings product was 
                                                
4 Laibson (1997), Angeletos et al (2001), Shefrin and Thaler (1981). 
5 Angeletos et al (2001), Bryan et al (2010). 
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framed and labeled creates a commitment mechanism and how it affects savings 
accumulations and other outcomes of low-income individuals in newly formed Village 
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. 6  Under the existing VSLA 
methodology, individuals are encouraged to save but make no explicit statement of a 
commitment to reach particular savings goals. Motivated by hypotheses derived from 
behavioral economics, the designed experiment explores how private- and public-labeling 
alternatives in the ways in which individuals are asked to declare their savings as 
earmarked for a particular purpose might affect program outcomes hypothesizing that this 
might work via differences in how mental accounts are created and labeled. Individuals in 
the private-labeling treatment create and label a ‘mental savings account’ and state a 
savings goal privately. In the public-labeling treatment, label and state savings goals 
individually but were then asked to publicly reveal and announce their chosen goals to 
other members of the savings group.7 In this way individuals in both treatment groups are 
able to label their ‘mental savings account’ and create private or public commitments to 
reaching individual savings goals. 
Behavioral economics has been increasingly accepted to be able to make predictions of 
field phenomena.8 An important result in behavioral economics is that mental accounting is 
a commitment mechanism that individuals use in inter-temporal decision-making in order 
to constrain their own behavior.9 Mental accounting was originally defined by Richard 
Thaler (1985) to be the process of mentally coding and categorizing transactions that 
                                                
6 In Colombia, more than 4,500 VSLAs have been formed with over 70,000 beneficiaries up to date. The 
program targets more than 5 million poor and extremely poor households registered at Red Unidos, the largest 
anti-poverty intervention in the country. The global outreach of the VSLA clients is of over 8.7 million in the 
five continents (Source: VSL Associates).  
7 I will use the words VSLA or savings groups interchangeably. 
8 Camerer et al (2004). 
9 Thaler (1985). 
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individuals create to mentally separate the money available make plans and keep track of 
their spending. Individuals assign their available income to different expenditure accounts 
and put labels such as rent, pension, entertainment, etc. This violates the classical principle 
of fungibility of money in which money should not have labels attached10, thus, one should 
be able to transfer money from one account to other accounts without any (implicit or 
explicit) costs.  
Individuals often rely upon mental accounts as a commitment device to mitigate self-
control problems associated with inter-temporal choices.11 For this reason, by implicitly or 
explicitly categorizing mental accounts, individuals impose constraints to their behavior, 
are often better able to achieve initially chosen savings goals and use financial services 
more effectively to raise incomes and welfare.12 As a result, individuals may save more 
when they save for a declared purpose. Relatively little evidence however has been 
collected from actual field experiments to indicate how much practical and policy 
importance such strategies might have on individual behavior. 
Thaler (1999) argues that how mental accounts are framed, labeled and evaluated are 
key components in the decision-making process. If fungibility is violated, the way in which 
savings choices are framed can have significant impacts on actual savings outcomes. This 
finding provides a framework for thinking about how individuals evaluate (open and close), 
frame and label mental accounts in a way to maximize their utility when making financial 
choices. For this reason, studying further these elements help us understand better how the 
process in which mental accounts, as a commitment device, are created actually matter for 
                                                
10 Thaler (1985 & 1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013). 
11 Bryan et al (2010), Shefrin and Thaler (2004) and Kast and Pomeranz (2009). 
12 Thaler (1985). 
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savings decisions. The contribution of this study is to investigate if opening mental 
accounts publicly, instead of privately, increases savings through additional constraints 
imposed to the behavior of individuals as a result of the ‘public’ nature of commitment. A 
recent field experiment by Kast et al (2012) shows that commitment is effective at 
increasing savings. It uses peers as a commitment device, while this study uses mental 
accounting as a commitment device to constrain savings behavior and investigates if such 
accounts could be artificially created by labeling their ‘savings’ account privately or in the 
presence of their peers.  
The RCT randomly assigned 137 newly formed VSLA, mainly in rural areas from nine 
municipalities of Colombia into two treatments and a control group. Individuals in the 
control group were exposed to the standard VSLA model. 13  In the private-labeling 
treatment members received an additional module with a short organized guided 
conversation aimed at discussing and highlighting the difficulties of committing to a 
savings path and the potential role and use of mental accounts in strengthening those 
commitments. I asked participants to voluntarily state in writing a savings purpose and 
weekly savings goals. This was intended to help guide individuals to form and label their 
mental ‘savings’ account to privately commit to achieving that savings purpose. Goals were 
not stated publicly. The public-labeling treatment was similar except that the group 
discussion encouraged members to make commitments to themselves as well as to others in 
their group in order to explore the possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. As 
in the private-labeling treatment members were asked to voluntarily state a savings purpose 
                                                
13 Members of the VSLA meet every two weeks to make contributions to a self-managed and self-capitalized 
savings fund by purchasing shares of the fund. In addition to savings individuals are able to take small loans 
on terms set by the group at interest rates that are typically much lower than available from other sources. The 
duration of the savings cycle is from 8 to 9 months at the end of which the funds are distributed according 
each individual’s accumulated shares. 
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and weekly savings goals in writing, but in this intervention, those commitments were 
shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals explicitly label their 
‘mental savings account’ and publicly commit to their own decision. Prior to the public 
announcement, individuals were not informed about the (public) nature of the treatment or 
their commitment.14 This module included a trust building game and a guided conversation 
aimed at highlighting the achievements of group commitments.15  
With the experimental design I studied how labeling mental accounts in a social 
environment (publicly) gives rise to higher savings rates, to higher achievement of savings 
goals and to changes in non-savings outcomes, in comparison to labeling mental accounts 
privately. Public commitment of savings goals creates implicit agreements that may affect 
or even change the behavior of some members of a group.16 The anticipation of “social 
punishment”, in the form of a shame act or harm to reputation acts as a mechanism to 
induce individuals to save more and achieve their commitments more often. As a result, 
higher savings balances and goal achievement rates in the public-labeling treatment group 
support this idea because individuals fear breaking commitments made to other members of 
the group more than commitments made only to themselves.  
If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, the marginal propensity to consume 
ought to be the same out of all sources of income and assigning labels to specific 
expenditures or accounts would not have any impact on how the money is spent. 
                                                
14 Although individuals seemed shy when the experimenter invited to share their commitments, 100% of those 
in the treatment intervention decided to share it with other members of the group.  
15 The trust building activity played at the beginning of the public-labeling treatment is called “Game with 
balloons”. One balloon was distributed to each member of the VSLA and they were challenged to push the 
balloon up and keep it in the air. Once they were able to hold them up in the air, I added more balloons, so 
that each participant had to keep an eye not only on their own balloon but also on the balloons of the others. 
The purpose of the game was to build a cooperative environment within members of the VSLA. 
16 Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Carpenter et al, 2010. 
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Individuals would just transfer money from, say, the ‘rent’ account to the ‘leisure’ account 
without imposing any psychological or monetary costs.17 If this were the case, labeling 
savings accounts (privately or even publicly) would not affect individual’s savings and 
non-savings decisions in the experimental sample. On the other hand, the classical approach 
to decision-making under uncertainty assumes a self-interested behavior of individuals. 
Therefore, choices should not be unaffected by other people’s decisions (neglecting any 
motivation of reciprocity and fairness that induce cooperation and enhances group oriented 
behavior). If this were the case, social networks wouldn’t be relevant for decision-making 
and individuals in the public-labeling treatment will not make any additional effort to 
achieve their savings goals or to change the behavior related to discretionary spending, food 
security, etc. and therefore, savings rates would be the same as in the other experimental 
groups.  
However, the results demonstrate very significant and strong results for treated 
individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by an average of 35% 
(effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were 8.5% more likely to 
achieve the initially established savings goals. The results for the private-labeling treatment 
intervention are heterogeneous. The quantitative and qualitative data indicates that such 
heterogeneity comes from intrinsic ability to save of individuals and on institutional 
features of the VSLA methodology that impose restrictions on individual savings behavior. 
In sum, treatment effects are very significant for individuals who are less economically 
constrained in their ability to save and insignificant for individuals that are less able to save, 
even prior to the intervention. This uncovers the fact that individuals experience different 
                                                
17 Thaler (1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013). 
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abilities to respond to the treatment interventions and must be considered in the analysis. 
The results are robust to different specifications, as described in more detail below. 
The estimations of the impact of these interventions on non-savings behavioral 
responses of individuals participating in VSLA groups in Colombia suggest an increase in 
the reported levels of trust in relatives and friends, changed participants' perceptions of 
happiness and safety in the neighborhood and led to reductions in discretionary spending of 
some expenses; but did little to affect many other decisions within the household or 
perceptions of food insecurity.  
I used mixed methods for data analysis at different stages of the research project. 
During July to November of 2011 I administered a baseline survey to 670 individuals from 
the experimental sample to measure a set of characteristics and choices prior to their 
exposure to the treatments. The second-stage surveying was administered in the fall of 
2012, when I followed-up the same group of individuals interviewed at baseline. I also use 
administrative records of 1,663 members of the VSLA gathered from two organization 
which I worked with: IED/Vital and Plan International. Finally, I collected qualitative data 
from focus group discussions to gather information about the experience and perspectives 
of participants in the study.  
The survey explores demographic information of the households, as well as nutrition, 
health, income, work related activities, expenditures, experience with financial services, 
among others. I use these data along with qualitative data to describe the type of individuals 
that, being offered, decide to participate in a VSLA.  
The intervention translates recent theoretical insights into experimental strategies 
implemented in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve the impacts of a 
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large-scale public policy program. The experimental design contributes to the 
understanding of how different strategies used to create mental accounts affect choices and 
contributes to the growing literature in behavioral economics and microfinance. The 
methodology represents a new approach to the study of individual behavior and provides 
valuable insights and information to program administrators and policy makers involved in 
the design and diffusion of commitment-savings products. The increased availability of 
these and other products with similar features may serve to increase savings, improve 
financial literacy amongst poor households, which may contribute to generate income to 
fight poverty.  
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Chapter 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In a recent popular press book, which summarizes findings from a body of work, 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2009) explain how to move people in a preferred 
direction by providing “nudges” to their decision-making process. They describe a series of 
field experiments in which the so-called “choice architects” construct a “choice 
environment”18 that influence the decisions of individuals in a certain direction. An 
example of this is the voluntary retirement savings plans (SMarT) created to increase 
savings rates of workers by setting default choices (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). 
A still small but fast expanding body of theory and evidence has focused attention on 
how behavioral economics might affect the design of microfinance products and how 
economists think about household pathways out of poverty. A recent survey by Bryan, 
Karlan and Nelson (2010) points out some theoretical and empirical concerns about the 
design and implementation of commitment devices. They discuss the effectiveness of 
different types of products and different types of individuals in determining the demand of 
commitment devices, and the ability to generate long run impacts on the behavior of its 
clients (Bryan et al., 2010). Commitment is an important tool that is able to help individuals 
to stick to the plan that is constantly delayed because the valuation of present choices is 
                                                
18 Choice environments are defined by setting starting points, incentives or defaults that draw the attention of 
individuals toward better choices. 
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much larger to the valuation of future choices.19 In other words, a demand for commitment 
is created when individuals cannot reconcile present with future decisions. In a series of 
papers, Karna Basu studies take up rates, sustainability and welfare impacts of informal 
savings products for individuals with different types of preferences (Basu, 2008, 2010 and 
2011). Individuals with time inconsistent preferences obtain commitment products in order 
to deal with the conflict between present and future decisions. Richard Thaler (1980) also 
establishes “pre-commitment” as an alternative to solve self-control problems for activities 
with a time dimension (i.e. consumption and investment).20 In this study, I designed and 
implemented an intervention that offered a soft commitment device to encourage 
participants of VSLAs to create and label a ‘mental savings account’, privately and 
publicly, in order to increase savings. 
The following studies provide evidence from the field on different types of 
commitment products. In a randomized field trial, Ashraf et al (2006) found that 
sophisticated hyperbolic discounters (more likely to commit) were actually more likely to 
open restricted access savings accounts and to hold a higher level of deposits. Other studies 
show that small variations in product design can increase uptake and savings. In the 
Philippines, Dean Karlan and others evaluated other types of commitment products that 
mitigate the “limited attention” problem of under-savings. Using an RCT they found that 
sending text message with gain or loss oriented reminders affected their savings goals. 
These experiments were repeated in similar setting in Bolivia and Peru. 
                                                
19 Individuals with such preferences are called “hyperbolic discounters”, present bias or time inconsistent. See 
Rabin and O’Donoghue (1997). See also Laibson (1997). 
20 See also Mullainathan (2006). 
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Dupas and Robinson (2009) found an increase in productive investment and 
consumption as a result of an RCT in which they offered clients to pay fees and minimum 
balance to entrepreneurs in Kenya. In another study (2010) the same authors measured the 
impact of a savings product on changes in consumption and investment rates. They found 
that opening interest-free bank accounts increased savings rates, investment level, private 
expenditures among entrepreneur women, and found them to be less vulnerable to illness 
shocks. Bertrand et al (2005) and Bertrand et al (2006) provide excellent discussions of the 
role of psychology on the behavior of economic decisions in the credit market for the poor. 
The first study argues the ability of frames and signals to induce behavior among loan 
clients. They found that incorporating psychology features (such as offers framed in loss vs. 
gain contexts) into lender's offers resulted more effective than standard monetary 
incentives, such as lower interest rates or longer repayment periods.  
Another way of dealing with self-control problems of individual behavior is mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1985). The concept of creating or categorizing mental accounts as a 
commitment device has been tested in some experimental settings in the microfinance 
agenda. “Mental accounting matters” for the consumption, savings and investment 
decisions of all individuals (Thaler, 1999). A growing theoretical literature, as well as 
evidence from the lab and field suggests that individuals often rely upon mental accounts as 
a commitment device to respond to self-control problems associated with inter-temporal 
decision-making. Mental accounting allows individuals to mentally separate the money 
available, make plans and track expenses. As a result, mental accounting may change 
consumption and expenditure habits to smooth consumption and it may even increase 
savings. Financial decisions are influenced by the way in which mental accounts are created 
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and evaluated. The decision-making process may depend on the scope and framing of 
mental accounts and the period of time in which they are evaluated (Soman, 2004). For this 
reason it is important to study all these elements of how mental accounts are formed in 
order to better understand how they actually matter. If mental accounting matters, it implies 
that the classical principle of fungibility of money is violated (Thaler, 1999; Shefrin and 
Thaler, 2004; Hastigs and Shapiro, 2013), and individuals do not, in fact, transfer money 
from one account to other accounts without any costs, use budgets and make plans to how 
to assign money to specific accounts.   
Kast et al (2012) evaluate the use of peers as a commitment device in two field 
experiments among micro-entrepreneurs in Chile. The study implemented two experiments. 
The first experiment tests whether peer pressure acts as a commitment device to encourage 
savings among microcredit clients that meet regularly to make repayments to their jointly 
liable loan. The second experiment adds to the reminders through text messages to 
unbundle the mechanism behind the peer pressure effects on savings. The intervention is 
successful in demonstrating that microentrepreneurs save more as a result of their 
participation in the self-help peer group. However, the authors show that the change in 
savings behavior is not necessarily related to the in-person meetings common in self-help 
groups, but in regular follow-ups, present in those. The effect of sending regular text 
messages to participants is as effective as in-person meetings. 
Bertrand et al (2006) analyses two features of mental accounting: labeling and setting 
defaults. By setting defaults or “irrelevant starting points” financial institutions and 
governments can increase the participation of the poor in financial services and improve 
welfare. Second, labeling accounts help individuals spend their savings in what they 
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initially planned. By assigning labels or specific names to certain accounts individuals will 
be less likely to spend it in something else (i.e. temptation goods).21  
I framed the experimental design in the context of labeling and categorizing mental 
accounts privately and publicly and measures its effects on investment and savings 
decisions and other outcomes. I evaluate whether labeling mental accounts in a social 
environment gives rise to higher savings rates and to higher achievement of savings goals 
in comparison to the privately created accounts. Public commitment of savings goals 
creates implicit agreements that may affect or even change the behavior of some members 
of a group.22 Individuals who participate in collective interactions value other people's 
opinions and use them in their own decision-making process. The creation of an implicit 
agreement among subjects in the public-labeling treatment group imposes informal (non-
monetary) sanctions or rewards on the behavior of others that motivates the enforcement of 
such agreements and helps stick to their initial plan. Similar to Kast et al (2012), this study 
shows that the in-person meetings are powerful in promoting higher savings rates. 
However, in this case, the implicit agreement created within the savings group is the 
mechanism by which behavior is changed. Although the two studies aim to prove the 
effectiveness of commitments devices linked to peer pressure, in particular savings goals, 
this study incorporates labeling savings goals or mental accounts and is able to separately 
identify the peer mechanism that gives rise to higher savings rates. The effect of putting 
labels to accounts allows transferring money to less tempting accounts, in addition to 
                                                
21 Shefrin and Thaler model of behavioral life cycle defines a hierarchy for mental accounts (consumption, 
wealth and income) from more to less tempting. By making individuals transfer money to less tempting 
accounts will achieve higher savings rates. 
22 Gächter and Fehr (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) and Carpenter et al (2010). 
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creating commitment and mentally categorizing expenses, as mental accounting has proven 
to be effective. 
Others describe the effect of social relations on the effectiveness of contract 
enforcement in group-oriented behavior. Theoretical as well as empirical findings 
contradict the pure self-interested behavior assumption and predict that fairness and 
reciprocity motivations enhance collective actions and therefore induce the enforcement of 
social norms. Social interactions achieve higher levels of cooperation among individuals.23 
Also, Masclet et al (2006) finds that informal sanctions that affect non-monetary payoffs 
motivate cooperation if monetary payoffs are unaffected. This result is reinforced by the 
findings of Carpenter et al (2006) in which reciprocity motivates mutual monitoring and 
attenuates contracting problems associated with imperfect information. Barr (2001) 
validates the effectiveness of social sanctions in inducing cooperation, in particular when 
there is some level of “familiarity” among members of the group.24  
In the microfinance agenda, a large body of evidence shows that poor households use 
informal financial services to smooth consumption, start up new businesses, save to 
purchase a durable good, or finance festivals and other events. Collins et al (2009) find that 
a relatively large portion of household incomes in Bangladesh, India and South Africa 
flows through financial products. Poor households use different informal savings products 
(self-help groups, ROSCAs and other providers) but they might be inadequate. Holding 
livestock or durable goods might be too risky because animals may die and goods may 
break, in which case savings are lost. Also, real returns on savings are often negative 
                                                
23 Fehr et al (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (2007), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), Gächter 
and Fehr (1999). 
24 This result was also obtained by Gächter and Fehr (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Carpenter et al 
(2010). The later study makes several predictions about the effect of various degrees of connectedness on 
cooperative behavior, in a lab setting. 
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because the interest paid on deposits is usually zero and in many cases they have to pay a 
deposit fee;25 and some people borrow money from one provider to be able to deposit a 
specific amount in a savings account or in a savings group.26  
Informal financial contracting is common in developing countries, where the supply of 
financial products is limited. Poor households save small amounts of cash flows that are too 
costly to collect for formal providers as well as for savers. This might reduce the effective 
use of financial products to these people and their ability to manage and accumulate assets. 
Even though bank accounts are offered, it is still costly to poor households to deposit their 
savings. Bank branches are usually far away from their homes or workplace, in particular in 
rural areas, where the cost of transportation is sometimes higher than the amount deposited.  
Besides transaction costs associated with the use of financial services, managing 
financial products is difficult. Individuals lack the willpower to reconcile present and future 
decisions. Decisions that involve a time dimension may require immediate costly actions 
that individuals postpone, leading to suboptimal decisions.27 This is the case of savings. 
People are aware that anticipating costs by reducing the consumption of temptation goods 
today may lead to benefits in the future. Even extremely poor households save and can 
often choose to save more by reducing the consumption of temptation goods (alcohol, 
tobacco, coffee and tea) and social or religious events. 28  However, the value that 
individuals impose on the delayed gratification of saving today sometimes is lower than the 
                                                
25 For further discussion see Ashraf et al (2006). 
26 This seems to be a common practice among women who participate in Spandana, a Micro Finance 
Institution that provides financial services to individuals in poor villages from India, which helps solve self-
control problems. Banerjee and Duflo (2011), Chapter 8 pp 196-197. 
27  Basu (2009) explains how different types of individuals with time inconsistent preferences may 
“renegotiate'” with themselves in order to reach a different equilibrium. 
28 According to Duflo and Banerjee (2007, 2011) 56% to 78% of poor and extremely poor households' income 
is spent in food. However, a large amount is spent in the consumption of temptation goods (alcohol, tobacco), 
celebrations and festivals. This is also discussed in Dupas and Robinson (2010). 
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cost associated with reducing consumption today. This is particularly true for individuals 
with limited and unstable incomes, who disproportionately spend a larger fraction of their 
income on the consumption of unnecessary (temptation) goods and for whom saving 
becomes harder than for wealthier individuals.29  
This reveals a demand for commitment products for time inconsistent clients, 
especially designed for the poor to increase access to credit markets. Expanding financial 
access can help the poor increase saving and investment in productive activities and allow 
them to take advantage of new opportunities. For example, Dupas and Robinson (2010) 
provided evidence that a campaign to increase take-up rates of interest-free accounts led to 
accumulation of productive investments and an increase in income for women 
entrepreneurs in Kenya. 
Designing and offering commitment savings products contributes to improving the 
financial capability of individuals and wellbeing, by increasing savings, empowering in 
their ability to manage and accumulate assets, smoothing consumption, improving their 
ability to cope with unexpected shocks, developing financial literacy and improving inter-
temporal consumption decisions. Innovations to bring down costs and improve the terms 
and usefulness of services offered are therefore the key to expanding service. However, the 
design and impact evaluation of new innovative commitment devices to this population 
remains a relatively new and under-studied topic in the microfinance agenda. Product 
innovations might work to expand financial access to help the poor manage their income 
and asset accumulation strategies at a lower cost. 
                                                
29 Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) and Karlan (2010) discuss this issue and its implications for the take-up 
of commitment savings products. Also, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) provide evidence of how individuals 
declare spending too much of their incomes in these types of goods. 
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Chapter 3: Who joins VSLAs? 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Savings is important to poor households. Capital and asset accumulation can help 
provide poor and extremely poor households with an improved ability to generate future 
income and more effectively fight poverty in the future and smooth consumption.30 Poor 
households save small amounts of money by stashing cash at home or via informal 
providers such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors; or save by holding risky assets 
(livestock, stored grain and durable goods).31 Although the risks associated with these 
forms of savings, it is more convenient or even cheaper than making deposits in a formal 
financial institution. High costs of monitoring and transaction relative to the size of the 
financial amounts involved have often worked to reduce both the supply and the demand 
for formal financial services or made access costly for clients.32  
Informal financial contracting is common in developing countries, where the supply of 
financial products is limited, particularly in rural areas. Also, poor households save small 
amounts of cash flows that are too costly to collect by formal providers and too costly to 
deposit for savers. But besides transaction costs associated with the use of financial 
services, managing financial products is difficult. Individuals lack the willpower to 
reconcile present and future decisions. Decisions that involve a time dimension may require 
                                                
30 Karlan and Morduch (2009), and Burgees et al (2005). 
31 Duflo and Banerjee (2007), Dupas and Robinson (2010), Collins et al (2009), Karlan and Murdoch (2009). 
32 Karlan and Morduch (2009); and Dupas and Robinson (2010). 
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immediate costly actions that individuals postpone, leading to suboptimal decisions. In the 
case of savings individuals have to anticipate costs by reducing the consumption of 
temptation goods today, expecting a benefit in the future. However, the cost of forfeiting 
consumption today is often larger than the gratification of being able to face an unexpected 
shock in the future. This is particularly true for individuals with volatile income, who spend 
a larger fraction of their income in the consumption of unnecessary (sometimes called, 
temptation) goods and for whom saving becomes a major challenge. 
For this reason, innovations to bring down costs and improve the terms and usefulness 
of services, formal or informal, offered to the poor are key to expanding service. Access to 
these arrangements helps them manage and accumulate assets, as well as smooth 
consumption to be able to confront unexpected shocks that may prevent them to fight 
poverty successfully. 
In this essay I explore the characteristics of individuals that decide to join Village 
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA). VSLAs are informal arrangements offered to poor 
and vulnerable households in developing countries that bring access to financial services 
such as savings and loans. Individuals self-select to join a VSLA and make contributions to 
a self-managed savings fund by purchasing shares of the savings fund in regular meetings 
(weekly or biweekly).  
 I use quantitative data collected from the baseline survey of the impact evaluation of 
the VSLA program in Colombia. The survey gathered information from 2,292 households: 
1,207 participant households located in municipalities where the program currently 
operates and 1,085 control households located in municipalities without the program. I use 
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information for the participant households only with the purpose of characterizing the type 
of households that, being offered the opportunity to participate, decide to join a VSLA.33  
The analysis is enriched with qualitative data collected from 4 focus groups 
discussions that I conducted with a sample of participants in VSLAs. In these sessions, I 
explore the perceptions of participants in VSLAs after some time of exposure to the 
program. I investigate the motivations to joining a VSLA and their experience during the 
first savings cycle (approximately 8 months). The discussions provide evidence about the 
effectiveness of the VSLA methodology in promoting savings as a result of the implicit 
agreements generated inside each savings group. The group-oriented behavior acts as a 
mechanism to change individual behavior toward the achievement of larger savings rates. 
For this reason, the VSLA methodology could be disseminated as a commitment product to 
increase the financial capability of vulnerable households.  
 
3.2. VILLAGE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 
VSLA are community based savings commitment products, built on the ROSCA 
model and other self-help savings groups as an alternative to formal microfinance that 
offers access to insurance, savings and small loans to the poor with limited or non access to 
formal financing.34 Individuals self-select and participate in a voluntary basis to form a self-
managed and self-capitalized fund to save and borrow periodically. Members make small 
and regular contributions to the savings fund by purchasing up to 5 shares in each meeting. 
                                                
33  The impact evaluation is being funded by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Interamerican 
Development Bank. The program is operated by Coprporacion IED-Vital. 
34 Over the last 3 decades, the VSL methodology has been implemented by anti-poverty organizations such as 
CARE, Oxfam America, Plan International and others, in different countries, namely: India, Bangladesh, 
many African countries and recently, in some Latin American countries. For more information visit VSL 
Associates. http://vsla.net/  
 21 
Savings are invested in a fund that is soon used to provide small, short-term loans to 
participants, used for consumption, making small investments in their businesses, and 
emergencies. In addition, the group contributes a small but equal amount of money in every 
meeting to constitute the social fund, which can be used as insurance in the form of grants 
for fatalities and other unexpected circumstances. The purchase of shares takes place in 
biweekly meetings with all members of the group and is recorded in a passbook. Each 
member owns a passbook to record transaction. Funds are securely stored in the safe box 
and kept by one member of the group until the next meeting. In Colombia, VSLA are 
formed by up to 19 members, usually neighbors, friends or family. 
The VSLA has a structured methodology and a set of rules that members establish in 
the first “training” meeting, before starting making contributions to the savings fund. All 
members of the group form a General Assembly, which elects a Management Committee 
consisting of 5 positions (chairperson, record-keeper, box-keeper, and 2 money-counters). 
The General Assembly sets the rules and conditions stated in a constitution of the fund that 
every member must agree and sign. The constitution contains information of rules of 
governance, dispute and resolution, conditions for purchase of shares, uses of the social 
fund, interest rates and the price of a share. There is a limit in the number of share 
purchased in each meeting. Each member cannot purchase more than 5 shares per meeting. 
However, occasionally, the group allows extraordinary purchase of shares by all members 
or sometimes the group purchases additional shares using money from group activities such 
as selling food at a fair, raffles, etc. The price of shares, interest rates on loans, contribution 
to the social fund and other rules are defined prior to the first purchase of shares, and are 
maintained throughout the savings cycle. This methodology helps households to manage 
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their cash flows and be able to accumulate larger amounts of money for multiple purposes. 
At the end of the savings cycle (approximately 8 months), the fund is closed and the 
accumulated savings are distributed according to the shareholdings.  
In 2008, Banca de las Oportunidades, a national government agency created to 
promote access to financial services to the unbanked population, launched a pilot of the 
program Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) in 34 municipalities. The VSLA 
methodology has been implemented in at least 30 developing countries around the globe 
and has proven to be effective in providing savings and loan services to local communities 
that have not access to formal services. To date, VSLA has almost reached 9 million clients 
worldwide. 35   Preliminary results from the pilot in Colombia show that individuals 
consistently save small amounts of money. It reached almost 7,000 clients with an average 
savings of USD 78 over an 8 to 9 months period. Loans were on average of USD 67 each 
and less that 25% of participants took a loan, at least in the first savings cycle.36 The 
successful experience of the pilot program motivated the expansion of this initiative to 
other regions in the country. In June 2011, the government started the expansion to 
organize 600 new VSLA in cities and rural areas with high poverty levels and limited 
access to formal financial services. Since 2013, the government and other multilateral 
organizations are funding the promotion of the program in more regions of the country and 
are planning to form over 2,000 new VSLAs. The funding organizations and governmental 
institutions jointly chose the municipalities where the program operates according the 
following criteria: (i) large percentage of population under the national poverty line; (ii) 
                                                
35 VSLA Global Outreach report. Hugh Allen, October, 2013. 
36 Banca de las Oportunidades report, VSLA pilot proyect, January, 2011. VSLAs are commonly operated by 
CARE, Oxfam America and Plan International, and many other local organizations. In Colombia are mostly 
operated by IED/Vital and Plan International.    
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low access to formal financial institutions (measured by presence of banks and other 
financial institutions); and (iii) geographical location (easily accessible). In each of these 
sites, field operators have different recruitment and socialization strategies, using the local 
authorities and religious institutions, agents of Red Unidos or even visiting different 
neighborhoods by word of mouth many members join a saving group. In the design of the 
program, 60% of the target population was members of Red Unidos, but once the program 
launched its expansion and the data collection took place, we could confirm that this 
percentage was not larger than 30%.37 In other words, less than 30% of the VSLA members 
belong to Red Unidos. In any case, this does not mean that members of VSLAs are not poor 
or vulnerable. Individuals that join the program are mostly self-employed with variable 
incomes and have different types of vulnerabilities. In the next section I describe in more 
detail the situation of the VSLA members. 
 
3.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
In the following analysis, I use data from the baseline survey collected in the spring of 
2013 for the impact evaluation of the VSLA program in Colombia. The study surveyed the 
household of individuals that participate in VSLAs (participants), and households of 
individuals that live in municipalities where the VSLA does not operate (control). I will 
only use data from the sample of participants, which randomly chose 7 households from 
                                                
37 Red Unidos is the largest Colombian governmental anti-poverty initiative that offers households priority 
access to the supply of social programs. In the component of banking and financial inclusion the network 
works with other government agencies to provide specialized financial mechanisms linked to transfer 
payments including savings, microcredit and micro-insurance. The network aims to help 16 million people 
who live under the national poverty line and 5.3 million under the extreme poverty line. These numbers 
represent 32.7% and 10.6% of the Colombian population in 2012. Source: Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadistica -- DANE. Currently, Red Unidos has enrolled 1.5 million families (1.2 million 
classified by the SISBEN index as extremely poor, and 300 thousand displaced from violence). 
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each VSLA created in the expansion of the program in 2013 in 7 states: Bolivar (280), 
Boyaca (149), Cauca (107), Choco (90), Cundinamarca (177), La Guajira (228) and Nariño 
(176). 
The survey collected data about: general characteristics of all members of the 
household such as education, age, marital status, etc., health, nutrition, housing 
(conditions), income and occupation, businesses, assets and land holdings, transfers, 
remittances, investments, expenditures, use of financial services, shocks, social networks, 
loans, social capital and domestic violence. I use some of the observed characteristics of the 
household for the analysis.  
Also, I use data from the first wave of the Colombian Longitudinal Study of Wealth, 
Income, Labor and Land from Los Andes University (ELCA 2010) in order to compare the 
situation of an average household in the country, in rural and urban areas. The sample is 
composed of 10,000 households (6,000 urban and 4,000 rural) and its representative of 
Colombian households from socioeconomic strata 1 through 4 and 5 geographical regions. 
It contains economic and social information about Colombian households, such as income, 
employment, education, property ownership, health, family composition, etc.38  
 
3.4. WHAT TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS JOIN A VSLA? 
In this section I describe the characteristics of the individuals and composition of their 
households from the VSLA sample and provide comparisons using the national average, 
rural and urban averages from the ELCA 2010. Table 1 summarizes the findings.  
                                                
38 For more information, visit: http://encuestalongitudinal.uniandes.edu.co/  
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a. Household characteristics 
Respondents of the VSLA survey are women in more than 80% of the sample with an 
average of 37 years of age. 65% household heads are men and 70% have a spouse or 
partner that lives in the house. According to the information reported in the total sample, 
the size of a household is of about 4.2 individuals, typically with 2 children living at home. 
A typical household at the national level and in urban areas has a similar size, but in rural 
areas households are commonly larger, in particular because they have on average 1 child 
more at home. See Table 1. 
Although the program targets poor and extremely poor individuals, only 26% of the 
sample belongs to Red Unidos, the largest anti-poverty initiative in the country. Despite this 
number, participants in VSLAs belong to households with high levels of vulnerability. 
Their homes are located in disadvantaged neighborhoods with very low conditions and 
more 50% of households are recipients of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) from the 
program Mas Familias en Accion, which provides incentives for school attendance, health 
and nutrition checkups. At the national level, only 1.67% of households are enrolled in Red 
Unidos, but a third of the Colombian population receives CCTs from Mas Familias en 
Accion. This numbers are larger in rural areas, where the level of poverty is larger. 
In the second panel of Table 1, I present the level of education for all members of the 
household. In terms of school achievement, 45% of the study sample completed elementary 
education, while the national level reaches 48.11%, in urban areas this fraction is around 
one third and in rural areas reaches two thirds of the population. On the other hand, the 
percentage of high school graduates is 24% for a typical VSLA household and 32.28% at 
the national level; with a larger percentage of individuals completing high school in urban 
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areas is much larger in comparison with rural areas (44.22% and 19.72%, respectively). 
Lastly, the number of individuals that completed college is very small in all samples. Only 
3.2% of individuals in a VSLA household have a college degree. At the national level this 
number reaches 2.9%, mostly driven by individuals in urban areas.  
 
b. Housing 
Near 90% of households that were interviewed in the study live in a house or 
apartment, and the percentage of homeowners is surprisingly large: 56% of respondents 
own their home. From these, only a small percentage is still paying for it. Among the 
financing options are reported: savings (39.4%%), inheritance (19.6%) and subsidies 
(around 6.4%). In a smaller proportion, households have used loans from financial 
institutions or employees (7.6%). On the other hand, approximately 25% of households in 
the study pay rent and around 20% live in the property without paying anything, although 
are not owners (see Tables 1 and 2). Homeownership for an average household in 
Colombia is much lower (49.24%) being households in the rural areas more often owners 
than in urban areas. 
Despite the large percentage of homeownership among surveyed households, their 
living conditions are relatively poor. Most of them sleep in one or 2 bedrooms and the 
quality of walls, floors and ceilings is not always appropriate. As shown in Table 2, walls 
are mostly built from brick, stone or blocks, sometimes unpainted, floors are usually 
unfinished and made of gravel or cement, or sometimes made of brick, tile or tablets. But a 
large percentage of households have their floors made of soil or sand, especially in rural 
areas, where this happens in 30.27% of the time. In urban areas the quality of floors is 
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normally better. On the other hand, the material of the ceilings is predominantly wood, 
brick or clay tile, and iron sheets or zinc. Often the materials seem good enough, but are 
either unfinished or in a bad shape. For that reason it is common to see in the patio piles of 
bricks, cement or clay tiles to make renovations and improvements to their homes. When 
individuals are asked for those materials they often say that is the way they use their 
savings and until the materials are complete, they do not start the renovations. 
In terms of sources of fuel for cooking, most households use natural gas connected to 
the public network or propane gas from a cylinder. Very few households use electricity, 
mineral coal, oil or petrol; but 23% use firewood or charcoal. The latter is more common in 
rural areas where houses are more isolated. Water for cooking and drinking usually comes 
from a public system or community aqueduct. In over 15%, it comes from a public pile or 
tanker and less than 10% from rainwater collection. For an average household in the 
country this is less common, especially if the household lives in an urban area. Sanitary 
conditions are relatively decent. 90% of households have access to a sewage system or 
septic tank. However, in 7% of the households don’t have access to a toilet.  
 
c. Health and food security 
Table 3 describes the affiliation to health insurance, episodes of illness and food 
insecurity for the surveyed households members of VSLAs. At least three quarters of the 
population belong to the subsidized regime, while 21% of the individuals surveyed make 
contributions to obtain a health insurance, generally through their employers. A small 
percentage of the sample reported having received a medical service in the month previous 
to the survey. In those cases, the person with the illness missed school or work for at least 5 
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days and paid medical expenses for an average of USD 35 in the month previous to the 
survey. 
In terms of food insecurity, the last panel of Table 3 shows that some households 
struggle every day to consume an appropriate amount of food. 14.1% and 8.4% of 
households reported insufficient food intake of an adult or children in the 30 days prior to 
the survey. More than 15% reported having difficulties to get enough food for the 
household. They had to reduce the amount of food or consumed less than 3 meals a day as a 
result of lack of money. Despite the larger percentage of households with this difficulty, the 
average number of days that this happened was over 9 in the last 30 days. In addition, the 
number of meals that the respondent consumed the day prior to the interview was 2.7 on 
average. In these situations, most households turn to their relatives, neighbors or friends for 
help and in less than 10% of the cases, take small loans from an informal lender or defer 
payments at the local grocery store. The social networks created in the VSLA allow 
individuals to mitigate such problems that often occur. 
 
d. Job related activities 
In terms of types of occupation and job-related activities, the data show that 42.30% of 
adults in VSLA survey work in a paid job. This number is similar for the average national, 
mostly because in urban areas the fraction of adults in a paid job is pretty high (close to 
70%). In rural areas, less than 30% of adults are employed in a paid activity (see panel C of 
Table 1). Among those employed, approximately one third of the VSLA sample is self-
employed, one third works in the private sector, 15% work in farming and the remaining 
work either in the public sector, as domestic worker or in other type of non-farming job. At 
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the national level, more than 40% of adults in the labor force work in self-employed 
activities and a similar proportion work in the private sector. Less than 10% of employed 
individuals work for the public sector. A similar situation s observed in urban and rural 
areas among adults that are in employed in a paid job. Those who did not have any paid job 
in the 30 days prior to the survey spent their time mostly: attending school exclusively 
(24%), doing household chores (25%), mostly young individuals and women, respectively; 
or taking care of other individuals in the household (less than 1%). 
In the case of household heads, 74% of them worked in a paid job during 30 days prior 
to the VSLA survey (Table 4). Household heads worked more frequently in paid jobs, but a 
smaller portion (15%) spent their time doing household chores, worked in a family related 
activity without payment (2.6%), attended school (1%), took care of other members of the 
family (0.3%), is retired (3%) or disabled to work (1.4%). See Panel A of Table 4.  
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, more than 30% of individuals work in a self-
employed activity. In terms of the type of business or enterprises, households report 
working in commercial activities (mostly catalog sales) or services (shoes and clothing 
repair, transportation and others) in 29% and 26%, respectively. The food industry such as 
selling prepared food in the market and fairs, or selling snacks and candy achieves 17% of 
the sample. Other activities such as arts and crafts, and mining are reported in 
approximately 5% of the sample, while 11% of the cases have a business in the farming and 
fishery industry. See Figure 1. According to the reports in the survey, these businesses are 
in general profitable, with profit of 42.8% of sales. However, we cannot determine what 
types of expenditures are being considered in the calculations reported by respondents (see 
Table 5). It is common among these business individuals not to include a salary for 
 30 
themselves or to fund those with household income (some expenses are shared with 
households expenses such as electricity or water). If those expenses were taken into 
account, profit would have been lower. The average sales in these businesses are USD 367 
per month. If the profits reported were correct, a household of 4 individuals could not live 
with an income of USD 150 – USD 200. For that reason, other members of the family 
besides the household head have to engage in income generating activities in order to pay 
the household expenditures. In a subsequent section, I describe in more detail household 
expenditures. Finally, not all businesses have profit of 42%. It varies by industry and type 
of activity. For example, businesses such as shoe repair, carpentry and other services 
reported having profit of over 60% of sales, while farming, fishery, mechanic and 
transportation had profit of less than 20%. These numbers also vary by location. Some 
businesses are more profitable in the Caribbean while others are more profitable in the 
countryside. 
 
e. Assets, durables, animals and land ownership 
Table 6 summarizes the ownership of assets, durable goods and animals for the sample 
of participants. The survey asked respondents if someone in the household owns any of the 
categories listed in the table. In terms of assets, most households have the basic home needs 
such as a bed and mattress, TV, and kitchen supplies. In a smaller portion, individuals own 
kitchen appliances and furniture (30% to 80%), electronics (8.5% have a microwave, 6.8% 
a camera or video camera, 35.5% a music player, 42.5% a DVD player, 16.7% a computer 
for home use exclusively), etc. For transportation, 35% of respondents have a bike, 19% a 
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motorbike and 6,7% a car. However, these are not for exclusive use of the family. In some 
cases they are used to run the business.  
Although many of these households reside in rural areas, the proportion that has tools 
for agricultural activities is very small. Only 41% and 43% of households own a shovel or 
machete, respectively. This is consistent with the low percentage of farming workers in the 
sample. Finally, animal ownership is also rare. 8.2% of households have cattle, 8.1% report 
having pigs, while 19.6% have chickens in their residence. These numbers suggest that 
households living in rural areas use these tools and animals for small-scale farming or for 
household consumption. 
 
f. Household expenditures 
Figure 2 shows the composition of household expenditures reported by individuals. I 
calculated the monthly expenditure and classified the reported items into the following 
categories: (i) basic consumption: food and groceries (including cleaning products), 
utilities, transportation and clothing; (ii) education expenses: tuition and fees, uniforms, 
books and materials, transportation and pocket money for children; (iii) housing: rent and 
any home improvements or repairs; and (iv) non-basic consumption expenditures: includes 
the purchase of durables and home appliances, entertainment, travel, lotteries, alcohol and 
tobacco and social events and celebrations. About 70% of household monthly expenses are 
allocated to basic consumption, in particular food, 17% to housing, followed by about 9% 
to education and around 5% to the consumption of other items.  
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Although the participation of non-basic consumption or discretionary spending is not 
large, the survey asked households if they had any unnecessary or “discretionary” spending. 
I am interested in this question because in many cases to engage in a commitment saving 
product like the VSLA, an individual may redistribute all sources of income into 
consumption and savings. The data show that 87% of individuals acknowledged that 
consumption could be reduced in at least one of the listed categories. In other words, 
individuals are aware of unnecessary spending and may be able to cut this consumption and 
place this money for savings. Utilities and regular consumption of food were the most 
frequent items that individuals reported to consume more than needed. Respondents also 
pointed out other expenses such as clothing, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, fast food, 
lotteries and entertainment. Table 7 reports the percentages. This information provides 
evidence that families are spending more than they consider necessary in consumer staples. 
However, in conversations with these families it was noticeable the desire to reduce 
spending of groceries to be able to save some money and make their regular contributions 
to the savings fund; in particular because it is the largest account from their budget. The 
consumption of other goods is not very significant in comparison with total expenditure; 
therefore, even if it is reduced, the money may not be enough to save. 
The survey investigated the difficulties that families usually have when they have to 
pay households’ expenses. Table 8 shows that at some point in the month prior to the 
survey, these families had some trouble paying their utility bills, food and debt (32%, 30% 
and 21%, respectively). Many individuals report more than one difficulty. In other cases, 
families experience problems to find the money for school fees (9%), rent (8.9%) or 
medical expenses (7.7%). The most common solution to these situations is borrowing 
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money from friends, family or neighbors (54.1%). Other alternatives are receiving 
assistance from friends, family and neighbors (13.9%), using household savings (10.9%) or 
using money from moneylenders (9.7%). However the latter is frequently an expensive 
solution to the financial difficulties. In 7% of the cases, individuals reduce the consumption 
of food and other items. (See Table 9.) The social networks created or strengthened in the 
VSLAs contribute to mitigating the financial stress in the future. Its methodology and 
access to different types of services provide alternatives such as access to cheaper and 
easier-to-get loans, the social fund (or emergency/assistance fund).  
 
g. Household income 
The survey investigated the actual monthly income and hypothetical or necessary 
income that a family requires in order to adequately meet its monthly basic needs. The 
reported actual monthly income of a household in the study sample is USD 355. However 
the majority of individuals consider that their household requires an income approximately 
60% larger (of about USD 590) to be able to satisfy the monthly basic needs without stress. 
Income per capita in these households is of about USD 99 per month or USD 1,188 per 
year. Figure 3 depicts the density of actual and hypothetical monthly household income of 
the sample. Both distributions are right or positively skewed, implying a larger 
concentration in lower levels of income.  
Comparing actual monthly income received by a representative household at the 
national level, it is larger than the one observed in the VSLA sample of households (USD 
391 vs. USD 355), where households in urban areas receive about 61% more than in the 
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VSLA sample or USD 591 per month per household. This number reaches USD 188 for 
households in rural areas (see Table 1). 
I also calculated the proportion of households belonging to 5 different income groups. 
Table 10 shows that 18.4% of households receive a monthly income of less than USD 150 
per month, 24.4% receive up to USD 250, 16.4% receive USD 251 to USD 300, 18.6% 
receive USD 301 to USD 450 and 22.2% receive more than USD 450 per month.  
 
h. Experience with financial services 
Information about the experience of households with, formal or informal, financial 
services prior to the exposure to the program was also gathered in the survey. Table 11 
describes all types of savings holdings for all households and the respective savings 
balances. I find that 41% of households that participate in VSLAs hold some type of 
savings before joining a VSLA. Most of these households, 26.4%, save by stashing cash at 
home for short periods of time. The data show that these households hold a cash balance of 
an average of USD 49 per month.39 The second most frequent type of savings is a bank, but 
this represent medium to long term savings, such as saving for home improvements, etc. 
7% of the sample had an average of USD 423 saved in a bank before joining a VSLA. 
Other savings alternatives are purchasing animals or seeds (3.2%) and keeping the money 
in self-help groups or ROSCAs (2.3%).  
At the national level, savings rates are lower. As observed in the ELCA 2010, only 
13.32% of households in Colombia have any type of savings; 17.06% in urban areas and 
                                                
39 This information was confirmed during the focus groups discussions. Women are more likely to keep some 
money from groceries into a can or a piggy bank. But it does not last long because women or other members 
in the household use it for unexpected or discretionary spending. 
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9.29% in rural areas, demonstrating the lack of savings in the country and the need of 
designing specialized products for all types of individuals (see Table 1 for data reported in 
the ELCA 2010). 
It is interesting that access to bank accounts is not a limitation for these households or 
for saving. 45% of individuals interviewed reported having an active bank account. 
However, it is used mainly to receive CCTs or government transfers (50%) or for payroll 
services (34%). Only 23% of households with a bank account use it to keep their savings. 
This small usage of bank accounts provides evidence that although poor households have 
access to formal financial services, information and knowledge gaps may be the biggest 
barriers to financial inclusion.  
Loans are another service that was reported in the VSLA survey. 31% of individuals 
interviewed reported having applied at least once for a loan within the year prior to the 
survey. From these, 63% applied in a bank or financial institution, 23.3% to informal 
lenders and 8.8% to relatives, friends or neighbors. A smaller fraction borrowed money 
from their employees’ fund, credit unions, utilities providers or pawnshops. In almost all 
cases the loan was provided. See Table 12 for reference. Banks and credit unions provide 
the largest amount of money borrowed. Fluctuating from USD 2,000 to over USD 2,200. 
Loans given by relatives, friends and neighbors, informal lenders and utilities providers 
were of between USD 250 and USD 370. Pawnshops and self-help groups were another 
alternative that provided loans for about USD 325 and USD 650, respectively.  
It is not surprising to observe the high incidence of loans among this population. In 
particular, informal lending from payday lenders, relatives, friends and neighbors is 
common since it is easier to access, is provided in a timely manner. Loans from banks and 
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credit unions are more often used for investments in businesses or financing new homes, 
for that reason the amount borrowed is larger and the repayment period is longer. These 
numbers are similar to what happens at the national level, in urban and rural areas. The use 
of credit is large among the population.  
This information provides evidence that vulnerable households may have some access 
to financial services. However, savings rates are very low. For that reason, designing 
commitment products to promote services are essential for financial inclusion. During the 
baseline survey, the study searched for the motivation of these families to join a VSLA. It 
is surprising to note that their perception about low savings is not just related to lack of 
access to financial services. Instead, members of the VSLAs admit that their low savings 
rates may be the result of behavioral barriers, such as self-control and temptation. 
Individuals report the following reasons that explain why saving in a VSLA is easier: 
saving with others (56.1%), savings in small amounts (16.6 %), quick and easy loans (6.7 
%), has no costs (5.2 %). Only 6.3% of individuals don’t have any other place to deposit 
their savings.  
 
3.5. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The qualitative information described in previous sections provides an understanding 
of the situation of individuals that join a VSLA and those who, being offered the possibility 
may join. The sample is a good representation of the types of individuals that participate in 
the program and provides rich information about their households’ characteristics. 
However, to capture the perceptions, attitudes toward saving and dynamics inside VSLAs 
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after being exposed to the program for one cycle of savings (approximately 8 months) I 
conducted 4 focus groups discussions in 2 municipalities. The results are reported below. 
Saving is understood as a mechanism to insure themselves and their household in case 
of unexpected shocks on their finances. Before joining a VSLA, households were skeptical 
about their ability to make contributions to the savings fund, mainly, because their income 
sources fluctuate greatly. However, a few weeks after being in the program and once they 
learn how a VSLA functions, individuals acknowledge that saving is an act of willpower 
more than it is of financial capability. Some of the impressions of participant in the focus 
group sessions were:40 
“When I received my money at the end of the savings cycle I thought: those are beers 
that I didn’t drink, but it was worth it” 
“I stretch the money that I receive for grocery shopping” 
“You have to sacrifice some things for saving” 
“I tell my husband that why doesn’t he joints the group, but he says that a dollar daily 
is nothing, they want to save 25 or even 50 dollars per day, but they frequently postpone it 
and never save a dime” 
“The savings group was liquidated but I continued saving on my own” 
Before being part of a VSLA most individuals reported having had different types of 
savings such as stashing cash at home, through a deposit collector, purchasing animals, etc. 
However, they were aware of the risks associated with those: “… thieves came and took my 
                                                
40 Translation by the author. 
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piggy bank from the house” or “it’s a temptation having cash at home, then why saving at 
home?”41 
In other cases, saving in a bank was perceived as a medium to long term saving to 
achieve bigger goals or life dreams, such as buying property or starting a business. It 
involves a planned, systematic and long run effort that in many cases is very costly to 
achieve. Also, the transaction costs associated with holding a bank account discourages 
individuals from using them to make deposits:  
“We have to pay the bank to keep our savings… instead of giving us return, it takes 
away our money” 
Their experience in the VSLA demonstrates a strong attachment and gratification to 
the program, which may be difficult to find in other types of savings. Although the savings 
motivations differ across members of the group, the sympathy created among them 
supports each other. Their behavior and decisions made usually benefit them all equally. 
They all share and nurture from their effort and discipline, building up trust between each 
other. Their experience in the VSLA enables a social behavior, values and norms such as 
cooperation, solidarity, transparency and respect. It is common to observe the development 
of social activities to raise their savings, and in many occasions involve other household 
members.  
Despite the benefits of learning how to behave in a collective environment in which all 
start under the same conditions, over time the group imposes their own dynamics, often 
motivated by the behavior of those who save the most. But when the group is 
                                                
41 Although keeping the money in a box as in the VSLAs is also risky, in all the time of operation of the 
program, only 4 boxes have been stolen, which is not very risky.  
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heterogeneous, some members feel anxiety and discomfort, creating disruption and 
problems in the VSLA. When this is the case, members that contribute smaller amounts of 
savings and are unable to catch up feel the social pressure to raise contributions. On the 
other hand active savers feel uncomfortable because a low saving balance is detrimental to 
the fund’s earnings. It limits the availability of funds for loans and at the same time the 
return on their savings. As stated by some of the members, social pressure to raise savings 
increase over time along with their experience in the group in the following lines: “the 
group exerts pressure and also competition”, and “when there are women, men are 
humiliated to constantly purchase more shares, because they are the ones who work and 
earn more”. 
In general, the VSLA methodology promotes savings among participants not just 
because it offers an opportunity to make deposits in a savings fund, but also because the 
social nature of the VSLA acts as an incentive mechanism to encourage a change in 
behavior towards saving. The group-oriented behavior also acts as a mechanism to 
achieving individual goals.  
In many cases the savings collected from the VSLA helps to create income-generating 
activities and provides economic independence from some members of a household:  
“My husband does not participate in the savings group and sometimes he scolds me… 
he doesn’t want me to find a job, but when I received my savings from the first savings 
cycle, I collected USD 150 and I said to myself: I will open a small shop… and I did.” 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
This essay describes the characteristics of individuals that belong to Village Savings 
and Loan Associations (VSLA). VSLAs are informal arrangements offered to low-income 
households in developing countries that bring access to financial services such as savings 
and loans. Individuals self-select and make regular contributions to a self-managed savings 
fund.  
 Using quantitative and qualitative data collected from surveys in Colombia of 
individuals that participate in VSLAs, I find that VSLA members are individuals that are 
above or in the upper limit of the poverty line. Although the target population for the 
program is poor and extremely poor households, the self-selection component of the 
methodology of the program make it hard to motivate poor and extremely poor individuals 
to participate in the program.  
I describe the observable characteristics of these households in terms of housing, 
composition of the household, health, food security, income generating activities, 
experience with financial services, ownership of assets and durables, and household 
expenditures. The quantitative information was gathered in April-June of 2013 for a sample 
of 1,207 participants in VSLAs. 
I compare the situation of these households with what is observe at the national level 
(total average, urban and rural averages) using information collected in the first wave of the 
Colombian Longitudinal Survey of Wealth, Income, Labor and Land (ELCA) in 2010. In 
many variables of interest, the situation of the VSLA households is comparable with those 
at the national level. This information provides a reference point for the readers of the types 
of households that join a VSLA.  
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Further research may be done to study how the VSLA population is compared to the 
average population in the municipalities where the program operates. I am currently 
gathering data from household surveys in Colombia with the purpose of determining how 
we may identify the VSLA population within the rest of the population and being able to 
validate the benefits of participating in this program with respect to other formal and 
informal arrangements. Also, the information could help determine if the characteristics of 
the municipalities affect the composition and formation of VSLAs. 
The qualitative data illustrates the change in behavior of individuals after being 
exposed to the program. Members of a VSLA are motivated to contribute to the savings 
fund as a result of the social pressure created within the group. Individuals learn how to 
save in a regular basis, find different ways to get extra cash at home or from income-
generating activities in order to contribute to the savings fund and be able to reach their 
savings goals, better prepared to face shocks in the future and improve the wellbeing of 
their household. 
Financial inclusion via informal arrangements may be the first step towards a change 
in financial behavior. Practitioners and policy makers should put some attention to 
designing or offering innovative products that are consistent with the heterogeneity and the 
needs of different types of population. Formal banking is key to helping vulnerable 
households to manage and accumulate assets. However, in many cases the existing supply 
of products and programs is inconvenient and does not match the demand or at least does 
not provide enough motivation for individuals to change their behavior toward savings.  
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Table 1. Comparison of situation of households between VSLA survey and ELCA 2010 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. And ELCA 2010. 
Universidad de Los Andes. 
 
Table 2. Housing  
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
VSLA 
members
National 
average Urban Rural
A. Household characteristics:
HH size 4.20 4.35 4.18 4.56
Number of children 1.9 2.6 2.14 3.05
Familias en Accion (CCTs program) 54.3% 29.73% 19.13% 41.97%
Red Unidos 25.70% 1.67% 1.03% 2.42%
B. School attendance:
Elementary school graduates 44.9% 48.11% 31.64% 65.45%
High school graduates 24.0% 32.28% 44.22% 19.72%
College graduates 3.2% 2.92% 5.32% 0.44%
C. Occupation and income:
Employed in a paid activity for more than 1 month 42.30% 45.32% 67.08% 22.85%
Employed government 7.30% 5.32% 5.34% 5.26%
Employed private sector 30.90% 41.18% 40.33% 44.00%
Self-employed 31.10% 41.49% 43.84% 33.64%
Household income 355              391              579              188              
D. Access and usage to financial services:
Save 41% 13.32% 17.06% 9.29%
Monthly savings 33                74                91                40                
Access to credit 62.90% 55.03% 60.80% 48.37%
E. Housing:
Home ownership 63.66% 49.24% 45.68% 53.35%
Floor materials (soil, bad quality wood) 12.50% 17.02% 5.54% 30.27%
Water from acueduct 67% 80.38% 95.56% 62.87%
Housing % %
Home ownership Material of ceiling
Own, still paying 4.7 Cement, gravel 12.0
Own, totally paid 47.8 Iron sheets, zinc 24.9
Rent 24.7 Wood, brick, clay tile 62.4
Usufructuary 20.9 Straw, bamboo, other plant 0.6
Sources of financing Plastic, cans, cardboard, waste 0.2
Savings 39.5 Fuel used for cooking 
Loan from financial institution 6.7 Mineral coal 0.6
Informal loans 1.8 Electricity 2.2
Inheritance 19.6 Natural gas connected to public network 34.0
Subsidy 6.4 Propane gas cylinder or pipette 39.6
Multiple sources 25.2 Kerosene, oil, petrol, white gasoline, alcohol 0.0
Firewood, charcoal 23.4
Material of walls Waste material 0.0
Clay and wood 6.2 Source of water for cooking and drinking 
Block, brick, stone, polished wood 81.2 Community or village aqueduct 20.3
Bamboo, other plant 0.3 Public system 46.7
Rough wood, board 7.0 Rainwater collection 7.6
Panel 0.5 Public pile, tanker, waterboy 15.2
Rammed soil 4.6 Well with pump 6.0
Zinc, fabric, cardboard, cans, recycling, plastics 0.1 Artisanal well 0.3
River, creek, spring 3.9
Material of floor Sanitary 
Carpet, marble, polished wood 0.2 Toilet connected to sewage 48.6
Tile, vinyl, brick or tablet 34.1 Toilet connected to septic tank 42.3
Cement, gravel 52.7 Toilet without connection 2.1
Unfinished wood 2.9 Latrine 1.4
Soil or sand 9.6 Do not have toilet 5.1
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Table 3. Health and food security 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
 
Table 4. Occupation 
 
Notes: Adults refer to women and men in a household with more than 10 years of age. Source: Baseline 
survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
 
 
 
 
Health and nutrition of households Participants
Afiliation to health system
Subsidized 74.4%
Contributive 20.7%
Not affiliated 4.0%
Health
Received a medical service in the last month 6.4%
Days absent from school/work due to illness 5.0
Medical expenses paid in last month (USD) 35
Food insecurity
An adult reduced the amount of food consumed in the last month 14.1%
Number of days an adult reduced amount of food in last month 9.2
A child reduced the amount of food consumed in the last month 8.4%
Number of days a child reduced amount of food in last month 9.4
Had difficulties to get food in the last month 15.6%
Number of meals that had yesterday 2.7
% in any type of paid job 42.3 74.0
Worked in a paid job 35.5 63.4
Family worker with payment 2.0 2.8
Worked in paid job at least one hour and did job search 3.0 5.2
Didn't work but had a paid job 1.8 2.6
Family worker without payment 1.5 2.4
Attended school and didn't work 25.1 1.0
Household chores 24.7 14.7
Took care of other member of household (elderly, children) 0.8 0.3
Didn't work because is disabled 1.7 1.4
Retiree, has a pension 1.3 3.0
Domestic worker (housekeeper, etc.) 7.4 5.1
Employee of private sector 30.9 31.4
Government employee 7.3 7.2
Farm work in other household/farm 14.6 16.2
Self-employed 31.1 32.3
Work with animals 0.3 0.2
Non-farm job (services, etc.) 2.1 1.5
Other 6.3 6.1
Panel A. Occupation, last week (%)
Panel B. Type of activity for those with any paid job (%)
All adults Household head
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Table 5. Performance of businesses 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
Table 6. Ownership of assets, durables and animals 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
Table 7. Evidence of discretionary spending 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
Averages:
Sales 367            
Expenses 210            57.2%
Profit 157            42.8%
USD
Telephone 5.1 AC 2.5
Cellphone 95.9 Fan 41.1
Bed 98.8 Bike 34.5
Matress 98.2 Motorbike 19.1
Dining table 47.1 Car 6.7
Coffee table 72.5 Boat 1.3
Chairs 90.6 Tools
Sofa 27.9 Machete 43.9
Cooking pots and pans 96.2 Wheelbarrow 13.1
Wardrobe 76.3 Shover 41.0
Washing machine 41.0 Hoe 20.6
Fridge 71.5 Pump/water can 6.5
Blender 82.6 Ax 26.3
Stove (electric or gas) 80.4 Chainsaw 1.1
Microwave 8.5 Mill 16.2
TV 89.0 Animals
Sewing machine 8.0 Cattle 8.2
Camera or videocamera 6.8 Sheep 1.2
DVD 42.5 Horses, donkey 4.7
Music player 35.5 Pigs 8.1
Computer (home use only) 16.7 Chickens 19.6
Vacum cleaner 0.2 Rabbits / Guinea pigs 4.7
Ownership of assets, durables and animals (%)
Household could spend less in… (%) Untreated
Fast food 7.9%
Tea of coffee 2.7%
Entertainment 7.1%
Cellphone bills 6.4%
Utilities 38.8%
Tobacco 6.6%
Lotteries 8.8%
Celebrations / events 3.8%
Alcoholic beverages 9.5%
Food 25.2%
Clothing, jewelry 19.1%
Other 1.6%
Cannot spend less in any item 13.5%
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Table 8. Common financial difficulties 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Solutions to financial difficulties  
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Distribution of household in income quintiles 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% of households that had difficulties to pay the 
following expenditures, in the last month:
Food 29.9
Utilities 32.3
School fees 9.0
Rent 8.9
Debt 21.0
Medical expenses 7.7
Entertainment 2.7
Clothing & shoes 10.9
Celebrations & events 2.7
How did the household solve the difficulty? (%)
Loan from relatives, friends, neighbors 54.1
Loan from informal lender 9.7
Loan from a bank or financial institution 1.9
Sold an animal, durable, or inventory 1.3
Assistance from relative, friend, neighbor 13.9
Reduced food consumption 7.4
Reduced consumption of other things 7.1
Used household savings 10.9
Did nothing 8.1
Other 4.0
Income quintiles (USD) Treated
Less than 150 18.4%
151 - 250 24.4%
251 - 300 16.4%
301 - 450 18.6%
More than 450 22.2%
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Table 11. Savings 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. 
 
 
Table 12. Loans 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED 
 
 
  
Savings
% hold savings
Savings 
balance (USD)
% holds any savings 41%
Bank or financial institution 7.0% 423                  
Cash at home 26.4% 49                    
Purchase animals or seeds 3.2% 333                  
Purchase of durables 0.3% 261                  
Self-help group (no VSLA) 2.3% 221                  
Lending money to someone 0.7% 343                  
Credit union 0.4% 277                  
Other type of savings 0.8% 326                  
Bank or financial institution 62.9 94 2,023                      
Informal lender 23.3 100 249                         
Credit unions 3.5 100 2,242                      
Relatives, friends, neighbors 8.8 94 298                         
Pawnshop 0.5 100 325                         
Self-help group (no VSLA) 1.1 100 648                         
Utilities provider 0.8 100 367                         
Other 4.8 94 340                         
% applied for 
a loan
% Received 
loan
Amount borrowed 
(USD)Loans
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Figure 1. Economic activities of businesses 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Household expenditures 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED 
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Figure 3. Household income (USD): real and necessary 
 
Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED 
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Chapter 4: Private vs. Public Mental Accounts: 
Experimental Evidence from Savings Groups in 
Colombia 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Savings are important to poor households. Capital and asset accumulation can help 
provide poor and extremely poor households with an improved ability to generate future 
income and more effectively fight poverty in the future, and smooth consumption and 
investment plans in the face of adverse shocks.42 Poor households save small amounts of 
cash flows via informal providers such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors; or save by 
holding risky assets (livestock, stored grain, durable goods).43 In all forms of microfinance, 
high costs of monitoring and transaction relative to the size of the financial amounts 
involved have often worked to reduce both the supply and the demand for formal financial 
services or made access costly for clients.44 For this reason, innovations to bring down 
costs and improve the terms and usefulness of services offered to the poor are key to 
expanding service. I design and evaluate two modifications of a well-established 
methodology of self-help groups in Colombia called Village Savings and Loan 
Associations (VSLA), in order to understand if private or public commitment through the 
creation and salience of ‘mental savings accounts’, affects savings behavior. The results 
                                                
42 Karlan and Morduch (2009), and Burgees et al (2005). 
43 Duflo and Banerjee (2007), Dupas and Robinson (2010), Collins et al (2009), Karlan and Murdoch (2009). 
44 Karlan and Morduch, 2009; and Dupas and Robinson (2010). 
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show that public commitment is very effective in increasing savings and private 
commitment has heterogeneous behavioral responses of treatment effects. 
Recent evidence suggests that self-control problems and time inconsistent preferences 
of individuals might prevent them from making optimal decisions in everyday scenarios 
such as waking up early, starting a diet, doing homework, or even saving.45 As a result, 
individuals often demand and rely upon commitment mechanisms to mitigate these 
problems. According to Bryan at el (2010), commitment mechanisms provide individuals 
with tools to help them stick to a plan that might otherwise be repeatedly postponed 
because of a disparity between their long and short run intentions. Frequently, individuals’ 
preferences for future choices are valued disproportionately lower over current ones46 
leading to situations such as clicking the snooze button of the alarm clock or delaying their 
workout one more day. As a result, individuals end up running anxious to catch the last 
train and a lecture from the boss, or having to bear that back pain that they have not 
managed to escape from. These situations are common when making financial choices. 
Consequently, savings rates and assets accumulation are often low, and this is not just the 
result of lack of access to formal financial services. A commitment mechanism is something 
that helps us promise our current selves to behave according to our future best interests. In 
the context of under-savings, a commitment device is an arrangement used by individuals to 
incentivize higher savings or penalize failure to making deposits. These rewards or 
penalties could be economic (hard commitment) or psychological (soft commitment). In this 
study I use a soft commitment device to evaluate how individuals respond to self-control 
problems associated to savings decisions.  
                                                
45 Laibson (1997), Angeletos et al (2001), Shefrin and Thaler (1981). 
46 Angeletos et al (2001), Bryan et al (2010). 
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This study describes the design and implementation of a Randomized Controlled Trial 
to evaluate if relatively simple modifications to how an existing savings product was 
framed and labeled creates a commitment mechanism and how it affects savings 
accumulations and other outcomes of low-income individuals in newly formed Village 
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. 47  Under the existing VSLA 
methodology, individuals are encouraged to save but they make no explicit statement of a 
commitment to reach particular savings goals. Motivated by hypotheses derived from 
behavioral economics, the designed experiment explores how private- and public-labeling 
alternatives in the ways in which individuals are asked to declare their savings as 
earmarked for a particular purpose might affect program outcomes hypothesizing that this 
might work via differences in how mental accounts are created and labeled. Individuals in 
the private-labeling treatment create and label a ‘mental savings account’ and state a 
savings goal privately. In the public-labeling treatment, label and state savings goals 
individually but were then asked to publicly reveal and announce their chosen goals to 
other members of the savings group.48 In this way individuals in both treatment groups are 
able to label their ‘mental savings account’ and create private or public commitments to 
reaching individual savings goals. 
Behavioral economics has been increasingly accepted to be able to make predictions of 
field phenomena.49 An important result in behavioral economics is that mental accounting 
is a commitment mechanism that individuals use in inter-temporal decision-making in order 
                                                
47 In Colombia, more than 4,500 VSLAs have been formed with over 70,000 beneficiaries up to date. The 
program targets more than 5 million poor and extremely poor households registered at Red Unidos, the largest 
anti-poverty intervention in the country. The global outreach of the VSLA clients is of over 8.7 million in the 
five continents (Source: VSL Associates).  
48 I will use the words VSLA or savings groups interchangeably. 
49 Camerer et al (2004). 
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to constrain their own behavior.50 Mental accounting was originally defined by Richard 
Thaler (1985) to be the process of mentally coding and categorizing transactions that 
individuals create to mentally separate the money available to make plans and keep track of 
their spending. Individuals assign their available income to different expenditure accounts 
and put labels such as rent, pension, entertainment, etc. This violates the classical principle 
of fungibility of money in which money should not have labels attached51 and therefore, 
individuals should be able to transfer money from one account to other accounts without 
any (implicit or explicit) costs.  
Individuals often rely upon mental accounts as a commitment device to mitigate self-
control problems associated with inter-temporal choices.52 For this reason, by implicitly or 
explicitly categorizing mental accounts, individuals impose constraints to their behavior, 
are often better able to achieve initially chosen savings goals and use financial services 
more effectively to raise incomes and welfare.53 As a result, individuals may save more 
when they save for a declared purpose. Relatively little evidence however has been 
collected from actual field experiments to indicate how much practical and policy 
importance such strategies might have on individual behavior. 
Thaler (1999) argues that how mental accounts are framed, labeled and evaluated are 
key components in the decision-making process. If fungibility is violated, the way in which 
savings choices are framed can have significant impacts on actual savings outcomes. This 
finding provides a framework for thinking about how individuals evaluate (open and close), 
frame and label mental accounts in a way to maximize their utility when making financial 
                                                
50 Thaler (1985). 
51 Thaler (1985 & 1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013). 
52 Bryan et al (2010), Shefrin and Thaler (2004) and Kast and Pomeranz (2009). 
53 Thaler (1985). 
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choices. For this reason, studying further these elements help us understand better how the 
process in which mental accounts, as a commitment device, are created actually matter for 
savings decisions. The contribution of this study is to investigate if opening mental 
accounts publicly, instead of privately, increases savings through additional constraints 
imposed to the behavior of individuals as a result of the ‘public’ nature of commitment. A 
recent field experiment by Kast et al (2012) shows that commitment is effective at 
increasing savings. It uses peers as a commitment device, while this study uses mental 
accounting as a commitment device to constrain savings behavior and investigates if such 
accounts could be artificially created by labeling their ‘savings’ account privately or in the 
presence of their peers.  
The RCT randomly assigned 137 newly formed VSLA, mainly in rural areas from nine 
municipalities of Colombia into two treatments and a control group. Individuals in the 
control group were exposed to the standard VSLA model. 54  In the private-labeling 
treatment members received an additional module with a short organized guided 
conversation aimed at discussing and highlighting the difficulties of committing to a 
savings path and the potential role and use of mental accounts in strengthening those 
commitments. I asked participants to voluntarily state in writing a savings purpose and 
weekly savings goals. This was intended to help guide individuals to form and label their 
mental ‘savings’ account to privately commit to achieving that savings purpose. Goals were 
not stated publicly. The public-labeling treatment was similar except that the group 
discussion encouraged members to make commitments to themselves as well as to others in 
                                                
54 Members of the VSLA meet every two weeks to make contributions to a self-managed and self-capitalized 
savings fund by purchasing shares of the fund. In addition to savings individuals are able to take small loans 
on terms set by the group at interest rates that are typically much lower than available from other sources. The 
duration of the savings cycle is from 8 to 9 months at the end of which the funds are distributed according 
each individual’s accumulated shares. 
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their group in order to explore the possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. As 
in the private-labeling treatment members were asked to voluntarily state a savings purpose 
and weekly savings goals in writing, but in this intervention, those commitments were 
shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals explicitly label their 
‘mental savings account’ and publicly commit to their own decision. Prior to the public 
announcement, individuals were not informed about the (public) nature of the treatment or 
their commitment.55 This module included a trust building game and a guided conversation 
aimed at highlighting the achievements of group commitments.56  
With the experimental design I studied how labeling mental accounts in a social 
environment (publicly) gives rise to higher savings rates and to higher achievement of 
savings goals in comparison to labeling mental accounts privately. Public commitment of 
savings goals creates implicit agreements that may affect or even change the behavior of 
some members of a group.57 The anticipation of “social punishment”, in the form of a 
shame act or harm to reputation acts as a mechanism to induce individuals to save more and 
achieve their commitments more often. As a result, higher savings balances and goal 
achievement rates in the public-labeling treatment group support this idea because 
individuals fear breaking commitments made to other members of the group more than 
commitments made only to themselves.  
                                                
55 Although individuals seemed shy when the experimenter invited to share their commitments, 100% of those 
in the treatment intervention decided to share it with other members of the group.  
56 The trust building activity played at the beginning of the public-labeling treatment is called “Game with 
balloons”. One balloon was distributed to each member of the VSLA and they were challenged to push the 
balloon up and keep it in the air. Once they were able to hold them up in the air, I added more balloons, so 
that each participant had to keep an eye not only on their own balloon but also on the balloons of the others. 
The purpose of the game was to build a cooperative environment within members of the VSLA. 
57 Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Carpenter et al, 2010. 
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If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, the marginal propensity to consume 
ought to be the same out of all sources of income and assigning labels to specific 
expenditures or accounts would not have any impact on how the money is spent. 
Individuals would just transfer money from, say, the ‘rent’ account to the ‘leisure’ account 
without imposing any psychological or monetary costs.58 If this were the case, labeling 
savings accounts (privately or even publicly) would not affect individual’s savings 
decisions in the experimental sample. On the other hand, the classical approach to decision-
making under uncertainty assumes a self-interested behavior of individuals. Therefore, 
choices should not be unaffected by other people’s decisions (neglecting any motivation of 
reciprocity and fairness that induce cooperation and enhances group oriented behavior). If 
this were the case, social networks wouldn’t be relevant for decision-making and 
individuals in the public-labeling treatment will not make any additional effort to achieve 
their savings goals and therefore, savings rates would be the same as in the other 
experimental groups. 
However, the results demonstrate very significant and strong results for treated 
individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by an average of 35% 
(effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were 8.5% more likely to 
achieve the initially established savings goals, when I use OLS regressions. Other 
estimations suggest similar results. The results for the private-labeling treatment 
intervention are heterogeneous. The quantitative and qualitative data indicates that such 
heterogeneity comes from intrinsic ability to save of individuals and on institutional 
features of the VSLA methodology that impose restrictions on individual savings behavior. 
                                                
58 Thaler (1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013). 
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In sum, treatment effects are very significant for individuals who initiate purchasing larger 
number of shares during the beginning of the VSLA savings cycle and insignificant for 
individuals that were in the beginning less able to save. This uncovers the fact that 
individuals experience different abilities to respond to the treatment interventions and must 
be considered in the analysis. The results are robust to different specifications, as described 
in more detail below. 
I used mixed methods for data analysis at different stages of the research project. 
During July to November of 2011 I administered a baseline survey to 670 individuals from 
the experimental sample to measure a set of characteristics and choices prior to their 
exposure to the treatments. The second-stage surveying was administered in the fall of 
2012, when I followed-up the same group of individuals interviewed at baseline. I also use 
administrative records of 1,663 members of the VSLA gathered from two organization 
which I worked with: IED/Vital and Plan International. Table 1 summarized the data used 
in the study. Finally, I collected qualitative data from focus group discussions to gather 
information about the experience and perspectives of participants in the study.  
This intervention translates recent theoretical insights into experimental strategies 
implemented in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve the impacts of a 
large-scale public policy program. The experimental design contributes to the 
understanding of how different strategies used to create mental accounts affect choices and 
contributes to the growing literature in behavioral economics and microfinance. The 
methodology represents a new approach to the study of individual behavior and provides 
valuable insights and information to program administrators and policy makers involved in 
the design and diffusion of commitment-savings products. The increased availability of 
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these and other products with similar features may serve to increase savings and improve 
financial literacy amongst poor households, which may contribute to generate income to 
fight poverty.  
 
4.2. MICROFINANCE IN COLOMBIA 
Informal contracting is common in Colombia, predominantly in poor neighborhoods. 
A recent study of low and middle-income households in Colombia shows that 90% of the 
surveyed families have borrowed money at least once.59 Of these, 83% used informal 
lenders (family, neighbors, friends or informal lenders) and less than 30% have used formal 
financial institutions (banks, cooperatives).60 Interest charges and other terms of financial 
access vary greatly. Almost all families reported holding liquid savings (e.g. saved cash at 
home, purchase of durables or through deposit collector). Yet fewer than 2% saved in a 
bank.61 Another study shows that that less than 4% of poor women save in a bank and over 
70% save in liquid asset holdings, generally to cover daily, unexpected, expenses.62  
Although many non-profit and government institutions have designed products to 
increase the access to microcredit, its beneficiaries are small entrepreneurs and households 
with income levels higher than the poverty line. The government is shifting the focus from 
                                                
59 The sample represents approximately 75% of lower income Colombian households. USAID-Econometria 
S.A (2007). 
60 Duflo and Banerjee, 2007 also find that almost all extremely poor households in their sample of one region 
of India borrowed money from expensive informal lenders. Only 6.4% of extremely poor households 
borrowed from a formal lending institution. In contrast, one third of the Indonesian poor population borrows 
from a bank. In their book, Portfolios of the Poor, Collins et al (2009) use financial diaries data to document 
the extensive use of informal lenders (mostly relatives and friends, some at no interest) by households to 
finance expenditures in South Asia and South Africa. 
61 Duflo and Banerjee, 2007 also found that few extremely poor households have a savings account, and if 
save, they do it through savings collectors or savings clubs like ROSCA or Self-Help Groups. 
62 Preliminary report of impacts. Mujeres Ahorradoras, Familias en Accion. 
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microcredit to providing alternatives for savings and insurance targeted to poor and 
extremely poor households. However, the design of innovative commitment devices to this 
population is a relatively new topic in the microfinance agenda.  
 One component of Red Unidos, the largest Colombian governmental anti-poverty 
initiative, offers households access to specialized financial mechanisms linked to transfer 
payments including savings, microcredit and micro-insurance.63 Information collected in 
the baseline of Red Unidos (nearly 600,000 households) suggest that 80% don’t know how 
to use the formal financial services available, and only 1.5% define a savings amount 
within the household. From these, 90% had a bank account but was not used to deposit 
savings, but mainly for transactional use. Only 7% save in a savings club or through deposit 
collectors.  Red Unidos initiated a pilot operation in 2007 in 37 municipalities, and started 
its expansion to all the regions of the country in June 2008 to enroll 1.5 million families 
(1.2 million households classified by the SISBEN index as extremely poor, and 300 
thousand displaced from violence).64  
In the banking and financial inclusion component of Red Unidos, Banca de las 
Oportunidades provides assistance to Red Unidos families to get access to both formal and 
informal forms of microfinance. In 2008, Banca de las Oportunidades pilot the program 
Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) in 34 municipalities. The VSLA 
methodology has been implemented in at least 30 developing countries around the globe 
and has proven to be effective in providing savings and loan services to local communities 
that have not access to formal services. To date, VSLA has almost reached 9 million clients 
                                                
63 Red Unidos aims to help 16 million people who live under the national poverty line and 5.3 million under 
the extreme poverty line. These numbers represent 32.7% and 10.6% of the Colombian population in 2012. 
Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica -- DANE. 
64 Red Unidos. 
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worldwide. 65   Preliminary results from the pilot in Colombia show that individuals 
consistently save small amounts of money. It reached almost 7,000 clients with an average 
savings of USD 78 over an 8 to 9 months period. Loans were on average of USD 67 each 
and less that 25% of participants took a loan, at least in the first savings cycle.66 The 
successful experience of the pilot program motivated the expansion of this initiative to 
other regions in the country. In June 2011, the government started the expansion to 
organize 600 new VSLA in cities and rural areas with high poverty levels and limited 
access to formal financial services. I used this expansion to carry out the RCT designed in 
this study. In 2013, the government and other multilateral organizations are funding the 
promotion of the program in more regions of the country and are planning to form over 
2000 new VSLAs.  
Village Savings and Loan Associations: 
VSLA are community based savings commitment products, built on the ROSCA 
model and other self-help savings groups as an alternative to formal microfinance that 
offers access to insurance, savings and small loans to the poor with limited or no access to 
formal financing.67 Individuals self-select and participate on a voluntary basis to form a 
self-managed and self-capitalized fund to save and borrow periodically. Members make 
small and regular contributions to the savings fund by purchasing up to 5 shares in each 
meeting. Savings are invested in a fund that is soon used to provide small, short-term loans 
                                                
65 VSLA Global Outreach report. Hugh Allen (October 2013). 
66 Banca de las Oportunidades report, VSLA pilot project, January, 2011. VSLAs are commonly operated by 
CARE, Oxfam America and Plan International, as well as other local organizations. In Colombia are mostly 
operated by IED/Vital and Plan International.    
67 Over the last 3 decades, the VSL methodology has been implemented by anti-poverty organizations such as 
CARE, Oxfam America, Plan International and others, in different countries, namely: India, Bangladesh, 
many African countries and recently, in some Latin American countries. For more information visit VSL 
Associates. http://vsla.net/  
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to participants, used for consumption, making small investments in their businesses, and 
frequently for emergencies. This is complemented by a social fund that is much smaller but 
provides insurance to members in the form of grants for fatalities and other unexpected 
circumstances. All the purchases of shares takes place with all members of the group in 
biweekly meetings and recorded in each member’s passbook. Funds are securely stored in 
the safe box and kept by one member of the group until the next meeting. In Colombia, 
VSLA are formed by up to 19 members, usually neighbors, friends or family. 
The VSLA has a structured methodology and a set of rules that members establish in 
the first “training” meeting, before starting making contributions. All members of the group 
form a General Assembly, which elects a Management Committee consisting of 5 positions 
(chairperson, record-keeper, box-keeper, and 2 money-counters). The General Assembly 
also sets the rules and conditions stated in a constitution of the fund that every member 
must agree and sign. The constitution contains information of rules of governance, dispute 
and resolution, conditions for purchase of shares, uses of the social fund, interest rates and 
price of the share. There is a limit in the number of share purchased in each meeting. Each 
member cannot purchase more than 5 shares per meeting. However, occasionally, the group 
allows extraordinary purchase of shares by all members or sometimes the group purchases 
additional shares using money from group activities such as selling food at a fair, raffles, 
etc. The share price, interest rate on loans, value of the contribution to the social fund and 
other rules are defined prior to the first purchase of shares and are maintained throughout 
the first savings cycle. This methodology helps households to manage their cash flows and 
be able to accumulate larger amounts of money for investment in businesses, education, 
improving housing conditions, or unexpected expenses. At the end of the savings cycle (8 
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to 9 months), the fund is closed and the accumulated savings are distributed according to 
the shareholdings. The VSLA methodology encourages savings and use of loans but does 
not make any activity to explicitly state savings goals or use of savings. 
 
4.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
I designed and implemented an RCT to study whether a commitment savings product, 
private or publicly created, may affect savings decisions of low-income individuals that 
participate in newly formed VSLA in Colombia. Under the existing VSLA methodology, 
individuals are encouraged to save but make no explicit statement of a commitment to 
reach particular savings goals. Motivated by hypotheses derived from behavioral 
economics, the designed experiment explores how private-labeling and public-labeling 
alternatives in the ways in which individuals are asked to declare their savings 
commitments might affect program outcomes, hypothesizing that this might work via 
differences in how mental accounts are created. In the private-labeling treatment, 
individuals label their mental “savings” account and state a savings goal individually; and 
in the public-labeling treatment, individuals label and state savings goals individually, and 
then share their goals with all the members of the group. In this way individuals are able to 
label their mental “savings” account and create private or public commitments to reaching 
individual savings goals.  
 
 
 
 62 
Hypotheses: 
People often find it valuable and practical to form “mental accounts” 68 as a device to 
constrain their own behavior. As a result, individuals often save more when they save for a 
declared purpose. This result indicates a violation of the classical assumption of fungibility 
of money. If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, the marginal propensity of 
consuming all sources of income should be the same and assigning labels to specific 
expenditures or accounts would not have any impact on how the money is spent. 
Individuals would just transfer money from, say, “rent” account to “leisure” account 
without imposing any psychological or monetary costs (Thaler, 1999; Hastigs and Shapiro, 
2013). If this were the case, labeling savings accounts (privately or publicly) would not 
affect savings decisions of individuals in the experimental sample. The standard utility 
maximization model suggest that accounts are perfectly substitutable, thus the marginal 
cost of using one dollar to purchase unnecessary or unplanned goods should be the same to 
the marginal benefit of one dollar in the established savings goal. As a result, in this 
experimental setting, labeling mental accounts doesn’t matter and savings rates should be 
the same for control and treated individuals. In addition, achievement of savings goals 
should be the same for all.  
Another classical approach to decision-making under uncertainty is that individual’s 
are self-interested utility maximizers. This indicates that their choices are unaffected by 
other people’s choices, and always choose an optimal action that yields the highest 
monetary payoff (neglecting any motivation of reciprocity and fairness that induce 
cooperation and enhances group oriented behavior). If this is the case, social networks 
                                                
68 Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Thaler and Sunstein (2009) and Kast and Pomeranz (2009). 
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don’t matter. Consequently, the experimental design predicts that (self-interested) 
individuals in the public-labeling treatment will not make any additional effort to achieve 
their savings goals and therefore, will not have larger savings rates or achievement of 
savings goals in comparison with the control group or the private-labeling treatment group. 
According to these interpretations I evaluate the following null hypotheses: (i) 
Individuals in the public-labeling treatment group have the same savings rates than those in 
the control group. (ii) Although individuals in the public-labeling treatment create their 
savings goals in a more cooperative environment, they save the same amount than those in 
the private-labeling treatment group. (iii) Conditional on savings commitments (labels), 
individuals in the public-labeling treatment are equally likely to achieve their initially 
established savings goals than the control and private-labeling treatment. Thus, if 
commitment devices matter, I expect all three of these hypotheses to be rejected. 
Assignment to treatment and experimental groups:  
I randomly assigned newly formed VSLA to two treatments and one control group in 9 
municipalities of Colombia. The assignment of the VSLA was carried out using a simple 
lottery and the method is called spot-randomization in which the assignment to treatment 
was random at the time when the VSLA was formed. For example, if 5 new VSLA were 
formed in a week in Cartagena, I draw the type of intervention that the VSLA would be 
assigned to (private, public or control). This status is maintained throughout all the 
experimental period. The unit of randomization is the savings group (VSLA) and the unit of 
analysis is at the individual level.  
Individuals in the control group are exposed to the standard VSLA model which uses a 
well-scripted model to organize eligible beneficiaries, and allows individuals to save and 
 64 
borrow for any group-approved purpose. Individuals in the private-labeling treatment 
group are subject to an added discussion module aimed at highlighting and discussing the 
difficulties of committing to a savings path and the potential role of using mental accounts 
in strengthening those commitments. The session ended by asking members to voluntarily 
state in writing a savings purpose and weekly savings goals. In the private-labeling 
treatment individuals create (open) and label their mental “savings” account that may 
contribute to higher savings rates.  
The public-labeling module is similar except that it encouraged members to make 
commitments both to themselves and to others in their group, which may let me explore the 
possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. This module includes trust-building 
games and a guided conversation aimed at highlighting the achievements of group 
commitments. As in the private-labeling treatment, members were asked to voluntarily 
state a savings purpose and a weekly savings goal in writing, but in this intervention those 
commitments were also shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals 
explicitly label their mental account and publicly commit to their own decision. In the 
beginning of the session, individuals seemed shy when the experimenter invited to share 
their commitments. However, 100% of participants agreed to share their goals with other 
members of the group and in the end became very enthusiastic about sharing their dreams 
with everyone in the group. The experimenter verified the accuracy of the written 
commitments. In addition, members of the savings group committed to help each other to 
reach their goal. For this reason I am able to calculate Average Treatment Effects of the 
treatment intervention on the outcomes of interest.  
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The RCT compares the situation of individuals who are statistically equivalent at the 
baseline but are exposed to different interventions. For this reason, any difference observed 
across the treatments and control groups is attributable to the intervention. The random 
assignment allows controlling for selection bias present in the estimates and allows 
determining causal effects of the interventions on the outcomes of interest. The hypotheses 
allow investigating how small variations in the information provided, and how it is framed, 
may affect savings behavior, their ability to commit (privately or publicly) to a savings 
product and their ability to use financial products more effectively. Other dynamics inside 
the VSLA may also be evaluated, such as whether individuals punish or reward the 
behavior of other members of the group, according to their performance throughout the 
savings cycle.69  
Experimental subjects: 
The target population is extremely poor individuals with limited access to financial 
services that participate in the largest Colombian anti-poverty intervention, Red Unidos. 
Using a national system of identification index (SISBEN), families are classified to receive 
benefits from social programs offered by national and local governments in a preferential 
basis. Some of the programs and projects offered to this population are: housing subsidies, 
conditional cash transfers (CCT), training programs, health and nutrition workshops and 
vaccination, etc. The VSLAs are an important part of the financial inclusion strategy to help 
extremely poor families to manage and accumulate assets and capital, and improve their 
well-being. 
                                                
69 It may be possible to observe what happens when a group member is always purchasing the maximum 
number of shares, or when a member is unable to raise their contributions to more than one share. In this 
sense, social taxation may be implicitly imposed within the group. Despite the interest of evaluating such 
behaviors, the quantitative data does not provide enough information. For that reason, in the focus groups 
discussion, I raised this discussion.  
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As data from the baseline survey shows, more than 65% of the sample population 
belongs to Red Unidos and are recipients of the CCT program, Mas Familias en Accion. 
However, comparing the sampled population with an average individual from Red Unidos, 
I found that participants in the experiment have higher level of education, report having 
more assets and more experience and use of different types of financial services such as a 
bank account, loans and savings (although through informal providers).  
 
4.4. DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE SIZE 
Sample Size:  
To select the sample size I used a (Multi-Site) Cluster Randomized Trial model from 
the Optimal Design software.70 I introduced an additional level of randomization, by 
stratifying the sample of new VSLAs in blocks or different sites in the country and 
assigning each VSLA to an experimental group (public-labeling, private-labeling or 
control). The randomization was performed within blocks in order to reduce heterogeneity 
in the estimates in each site. Sites or blocks were defined as municipalities (9 in total). The 
randomization uses a cluster design because of the nature of the savings groups program 
and the nature of the interventions testes. As a result, treatment assignment is at the group 
level (VSLA) while the unit of analysis is at the individual level. For this reason, I need to 
account for the within-group correlation.71 
                                                
70 Spybrook et al (2011). 
71 The (standardized) parameters used for this calculations were as follows: Significance level: 𝛼 = 0.05; 
Intra-cluster correlation in the range of: lower bound 𝜌 = 0.05 and an upper bound of 𝜌 = 0.25. This 
parameter was assumed considering an intra-cluster covariance of 0.75 to 0.95 based on information from the 
pilot. The variance explained by the introduction of the controls not larger than 0.5. An effect size or 
Minimum Detectable Effect (MDE) of 0.3 standard deviations of savings balances among those in the public-
labeling treatment versus those in the control group and MDE of 0.2 standard deviations more savings for the 
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The sample needed to achieve a statistical power of 80% in each site is approximately 
15 clusters. 72 In total, I selected 137 VSLAs. One third is assigned to each experimental 
group (control, public-labeling and private-labeling). From each selected VSLA, all 
individuals were part of the experimental sample, but I randomly chose 5 members to be 
surveyed at their house to collect demographic characteristics.73 In total, the study surveyed 
670 experimental subjects at two points in time but uses administrative records of savings 
balances for all 137 savings groups, which allowed having a much larger sample to 
measure treatment effects. In total the study sample to measure treatment effects is of 1,663 
individuals distributed across the three experimental groups.  
 
Quantitative data:  
I use two sources of data in the study. First household surveys collected to the sample of 
670 individuals at two points in time:  
i. Baseline: Prior to the intervention, I had the list of members of the newly formed 
VSLA. I randomly chose 5 individuals to be interviewed. The survey took place before 
the intervention at the place of residence of the individual. I measure a set of individual 
and household variables in order to evaluate the impact in well-being of the household 
and other outcomes as a result of participation in the intervention. I collect data on 
                                                                                                                                               
public-labeling treatment over private-labeling treatment group. The number of individuals per cluster to be 
treated is n = 13; however, only 5 individuals from each cluster were chosen for the household survey. I also 
carried out power analysis for sample size calculation using the commands Sampsi and Samclus in Stata and 
the results did not change. 
72 Two other parameters such as the variance explained by the introduction of controls and the variance 
explained by blocking were 0.5 and 0.25 respectively. I introduced these parameters in the calculations 
because I include some covariates in the regressions in order to gain some precision in the estimated 
parameters.  
73 Program officers handed a list of all the members of the VSLA and I selected 5 individuals from each to be 
surveyed in the baseline, at random. 
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demographic characteristics, use and experience of financial services, housing, poverty, 
food security, household income and expenditures, social capital, ability to cope with 
unexpected shocks and time preferences. 
ii. Follow-up: I administered a follow-up survey after the first savings cycle was 
closed and savings were distributed among the members of the VSLA. The follow-up 
survey allows comparing the situation of participants at two points in time, but given the 
random assignment of the experimental groups, any difference in the outcomes of interest 
across treatments and control after the intervention should captures the average treatment 
effect. Attrition could be a potential bias of the estimates of this study, however, in cases 
when the VSLA was dissolved before the pre-established period or a member decided to 
defect, I was able to reach them during the follow-up. Because of this, the loss in sample 
was very small, less than 5% of the individuals interviewed at baseline did not participate 
in the follow-up. 
I also use administrative records from program officials. To complete the sample I 
worked along with two practitioner institutions in the study. IED/Vital and Plan 
International. Two-thirds of the experimental sample was chosen in IED/Vital sites and 
one-third in Plan International sites. Although the VSLA methodology in the field followed 
by each organization was exactly the same, the information systems and management of 
data differ. In particular, the level of detail differs across organizations’ records throughout 
the first savings cycle. But overall the information is very useful to evaluate the hypotheses 
of the study.  
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Interventions:  
During the interventions, the experimenter collected and recorded the savings goals 
written by participants in a piece of paper. The principal researcher kept the information in 
a safe place without access to anybody. In total, I have data on savings purposes and 
weekly savings goals from 903 individuals that participated in the public-labeling and 
private-labeling interventions. 
 
Qualitative data:  
I collected qualitative information from 4 focus group discussions with the purpose of 
exploring further questions related to the understanding of achievement of goals in 
treatment and control groups. I also explored other behaviors and perceptions of individuals 
as a result of the interventions. The focus groups discussions took place in two of the nine 
experimental sites and recruited 30 individuals from the experimental sample. The sample 
was split between men and women to perform the discussion separately. 
 
4.5. RESULTS 
Baseline survey: 
Data gathered at baseline suggest that the outcomes of interest and other covariates 
related to savings are balanced across experimental groups. This implies that the 
randomization was effective. Table 3 provides evidence on this statement. It shows no 
statistical differences across control, public- and private-labeling in most pre-treatments 
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characteristics. As a result, any difference in outcomes post-treatment can be attributed to 
the intervention. Table 3 also shows descriptive statistics of the studied sample.  
The household size of subjects is between 4.55 for households in the private-labeling 
treatment group and 4.72 for households in the control and public-labeling treatment group. 
Over 60% are married or live with their partner and have less than 2 children of 15 years or 
less living at home. As shown in Table 3, I find significant differences in the number of 
children between the private-labeling treatment and the other experimental groups. It is 
also important to note that most VSLA participants are women. The percentage of women 
varies from 77% to 82% across treatments and control but its difference is not significantly 
different from zero. Another variable that illustrates a difference between the experimental 
groups is whether a family is recipient of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). The number is 
significantly lower for the private treatment group. However, the numbers are large. 
Around 60% of households in the sample receive CCTs of Mas Familias en Accion. In 
contrast, a very small number of households receive in-kind or cash transfers from Adulto 
Mayor, a popular elderly transfers program in Colombia.  
The data also reveal that 27% to 33% of the sample held any type of savings before 
participating in the VSLA program. Their weekly savings rates varied on average from 
USD 5.4 for the private-labeling treatment to USD 7.1 for the control groups. Although the 
averages are different, they are not statistically different from zero, implying that on 
average, individuals in the experimental sample saved more or less the same amount prior 
to the treatment intervention.  
An interesting result is that around 50% of all subjects report having a bank account. 
However, they don’t use it for savings, but rather for transactions. Households commonly 
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use bank accounts to receive their CCT payments or to receive their salary. In fact, over 
60% of those who have a bank account declared to open the account exclusively to receive 
their CCT payments of Mas Familias en Accion. I asked individuals in the sample if 
someone in the household took a loan or made an investment in the past 12 months. 13% to 
17% took a loan and 33% to 39% of the sample made an investment in purchase of animals, 
house improvements, new or existing businesses, etc. Although households use (mostly 
informal) financial services, they are not familiar with writing a budget. Household 
incomes vary greatly over time; in fact, only 40% of respondent report having a paid job in 
the last month. As it is commonly observed in this population, they mainly have informal 
jobs.  
Surprisingly over 60% of individuals own the house where they currently reside. This 
result is very noteworthy because most savings goals are related to home improvement or 
acquisition of a new home, suggesting that the conditions of their homes are suboptimal for 
living. A smaller number of individuals reported participating in community activities such 
as sports clubs, political party, community organization, women’s clubs, etc.  
I included in the set of variables the average of an index that measures trust in financial 
institutions. From 1 to 5, I asked surveyed individuals how much they trusted banks and 
financial institutions where 1 is untrustworthy and 5 is completely trustworthy. On average, 
the level of trust is larger than 3. This may inform us that there are other reasons different 
than trust why these individuals are not using formal financial services. Finally, the average 
number of members of the VSLA is over 13 across all groups. The second panel of the 
Table 3 presents the mean difference of a set of variables that measure the perception of 
individuals about the ability to save of their households. I asked if they are think their 
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households could save “much more”, “more”, “the same” or “not save at all”. I carried out 
a Pearson’s chi-squared test to evaluate the associated values for each possible response for 
the different experimental groups. The joint test is not significantly different from zero 
across all experimental groups (the p-value is 0.294). However, I observe a difference in 
the perception that households could save the same. It is much larger for the control than 
for both the private- and public-labeling treatment groups. These results indicate that prior 
to the intervention, households across experimental groups are similar in their perception 
about their ability to save.  
 
Savings commitments: 
After the baseline survey was administered, individuals received the standard training 
of the VSLA methodology. During one of these sessions I performed the treatment 
interventions in which individuals set savings goals and label mental accounts privately or 
publicly. After a short discussion, I asked each individual from the public-labeling and 
private-labeling treatments to write down in a piece of paper their individual commitment 
for their savings. I asked: “What is your plan for the funds saved in this savings group?” 
The responses varied from home improvements, education expenditures and investment in 
businesses, to health, travel and unexpected expenditures.  
Table 4 disaggregates the responses between public-labeling and private-labeling 
treatment groups. The data show that about 34% to 43% of participants plan to save in the 
VSLA for home improvements or purchase of a new home, around 25% for education for 
children or other members of the household, and 25% to 28% to invest in an existing or a 
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new business.74 Other savings purposes are: consumption of non-durables such as clothing, 
food, celebrations and events (8% to 16%); consumption of durable goods such as 
computers, appliances or jewelry (7% to 12%); for an unexpected expenditure or for 
emergencies (3% to 4%) and other expenses accounts for less than 3%.75 The third column 
of the table displays the t-statistic resulting from the mean comparison of the responses 
between the treated individuals. As shown in the table, there are no statistical differences 
across treated subjects for most of the stated savings goals. Only the average savings goal 
specific to the purchase of a non-durable good such a bicycle, motorbike, computer, 
jewelry, etc. is statistically different for the treated groups.  
The second set of variables in the table illustrates the amount of savings that 
individuals plan to contribute every meeting during the first savings cycle and the 
willingness of taking up loans. Individuals from the private-labeling treatment set a 
biweekly savings goal of purchasing approximately 3.06 shares in the VSLA meeting, 
while individuals from the public-labeling treatment define a savings goal of purchasing 
approximately 3.1 shares. The difference between the number of shares that individuals 
from each treatment group plan to save weekly is not statistically significant. In contrast, I 
observe statistically significant differences between public- and private-labeling treatments 
in what individuals express to save in terms of money, prior to the intervention. The 
discrepancy between the differences in the number of shares and the savings balances can 
be explained by the difference in shares prices across experimental groups. This may be the 
result of differences in savings capability across experimental groups. 
 
                                                
74 This category includes also a retirement plan or to continue saving. 
75 Such as traveling, purchase of a gift, insurance, etc. 
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Treatment effects on savings: 
If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, and if individuals behaved in a 
selfish manner, savings choices should not be affected by labeling savings accounts or by 
other people’s decisions. However, the results show very significant and strong results for 
treated individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by an average of 
35% (effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were 8.5 more likely to 
achieve initially established savings goals. For individuals in the private-labeling treatment 
intervention results on savings are heterogeneous. In the following paragraphs I explain in 
more detail these findings. The quantitative and qualitative data indicate that such 
heterogeneity comes from intrinsic ability to save of individuals and on institutional 
features of the VSLA methodology that impose restrictions on individual savings behavior. 
In sum, treatment effects are very significant for individuals who start saving a large 
number of shares in the beginning of the savings cycle and insignificant for individuals that 
are less able to save, even prior to the intervention. However, treatment effects are on 
average insignificant. This uncovers the fact that individuals experience different abilities 
to respond to the treatment interventions and must be considered in the analysis. The results 
are robust to different specifications, as described in more detail below. 
 The random assignment of subjects to experimental groups allows estimating the 
causal effect of the interventions. Differences in the variables of interest capture the 
average treatment effect of labeling ‘mental savings accounts’ (that was opened in the 
beginning of the VSLA) privately or publicly on savings and other behaviors of treated 
subjects. I estimate a simple (OLS) model of differences in savings rates and on the number 
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of shares purchased over the first savings cycle, after exposure to the intervention. The 
model estimated is:  
(1)   𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝜀!     
where, 𝑌! is the dependent variable, 𝑇! represents the treatment status for each individual in 
the sample, R represents private-labeling treatment, U represents public-labeling treatment 
and 𝜀! is the disturbance term. 
Selection bias is eliminated because of the random assignment of VSLA into different 
groups (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The coefficients measure the average treatment effects 
(ATE) of participating in the public-labeling or private-labeling intervention. The 
coefficients 𝛽!  and 𝛽!  measure the average or mean difference in the outcome for 
individuals in private-labeling and public-labeling treatment interventions, respectively (or 
treated), in comparison with individuals in the control group (or untreated). Table 5 
presents the treatment effects on savings from estimating equation (1) using administrative 
records. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors by clustering at the VSLA 
level. I estimated the treatment effects on savings accumulations measured with the number 
of shares purchased by each individual under various scenarios: first (column 1) during the 
entire savings cycle, second (column 2) during the first 6 meetings76, lastly (column 3) 
during the entire savings cycle but for only those with the exact same share price.  
The regression results in panel A show that both private- and public commitment are 
successful in increasing savings accumulations (measured by the number of shares 
                                                
76 This specification is used in order to check for persistence of the treatment interventions on individual’s 
savings behavior. The average number of meetings in the first savings cycle is 15.8. However, I only have this 
information for two thirds of the sample. For the remaining, I have detailed information of until the sixth 
meeting. 
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purchased by participants in each meeting). In the total savings cycle individuals in the 
private-labeling treatment saved on average 6 shares more, representing a 17% (0.3 
standard deviations) increase in savings in comparison with the controls. Moreover, the 
increase in shares purchased by those in the public-labeling treatment was 12.4 shares or 35 
percentage points (0.61 standard deviations) more than the controls.  
The significance level of the coefficients for specifications 2 and 3 is robust. This 
provides evidence that if I estimate the model for the first 6 meetings only, the treatment 
effects are very strong for both interventions, although the point estimates are smaller. On 
the other hand, estimating the ATE for the subsample with the same share price (P = COL 
5,000) provides evidence of the effectiveness of the interventions for all individuals under 
the same conditions. In this case, I isolate the possible heterogeneity in opportunities to 
save across savings groups. The findings show that private commitment increases savings 
by 25% while public commitment increases savings by 34%.  
The last row shows the Chi squared-statistic corresponding to testing the joint 
significance of the private vs. public treatment effect. The effect on savings of publicly 
announcing savings goals is almost 50% larger than the effect of private commitments. The 
point estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level in specifications (1) to (3). 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the treatment effects for the total amount of money saved 
over the savings cycle. This variable is constructed by multiplying the total number of 
shares purchased during the savings cycle by the price of the share in the VSLAs where the 
individual belongs. Interestingly the coefficients representing the ATE for the public and 
private labeling interventions are insignificant in specifications 4 and 5. But once I isolate 
the differences in share prices across savings groups (specification in column 6), the 
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coefficients are significant for both interventions. As shown in column 6, the private-
labeling treatment increases savings balances during the first savings cycle by USD 22.5 
while the public-labeling treatment increases savings balances by USD 31.1. These point 
estimates represent an increase of 25% and 34% respectively. These results show that the 
share price is important in predicting savings because it affects the behavior of individuals 
by imposing constraints on their ability to save in the VSLA.  
For some individuals the behavioral response to treatments runs up against institutional 
features that restrict the optimal savings, such as the maximum of shares allowed to 
purchase in each meeting, individuals can only buy an integer (0 to 5) number of shares and 
the rigidity in share prices during the entire savings cycle. These restrictions are observed 
when an individual is willing to purchase 1.5 instead of 2 shares and ends up purchasing a 
single one, or in cases in which a participant is capable of purchasing more than 5 shares 
but is only allowed a maximum of 5. As a result, individuals within a VSLA face different 
constraints that depend not only on their own capability to raise money to make 
contributions to the fund, but on the savings capability of other members and the rules set 
in their own VSLA (mainly price shares).  
To be more precise about the first constraint, individuals in VSLAs save exactly 0, 1P, 
2P, 3P, 4P or 5P pesos during each meeting. This implies that the data is left, right and 
'interval' censored, instead of observing the preferred level of savings, and that OLS 
parameter estimates are biased, despite randomization of treatment status. For that reason, I 
estimate a latent variable model, as shown in the following equations:  
 (3)  𝑆!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇! + 𝜀!     
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(4)   𝑆!,! =
0,                𝑖𝑓                𝑆!,! < 𝑃𝑃, 𝑖𝑓      𝑃 ≤ 𝑆!,! < 2𝑃2𝑃, 𝑖𝑓    2𝑃   ≤ 𝑆!,! < 3𝑃3𝑃, 𝑖𝑓    3𝑃   ≤ 𝑆!,! < 4𝑃4𝑃, 𝑖𝑓    4𝑃   ≤ 𝑆!,! < 5𝑃5𝑃,                𝑖𝑓                𝑆!,! > 5𝑃
 
where SL,i corresponds to the underlying savings preference, Ti whether individual i 
receives treatment or not, 𝜀! is an iid idiosyncratic disturbance term, SC,i represents the 
observed level of savings and P the price of shares in each VSLA. Assuming that 
individuals never exceed their latent savings preference and choose the highest available 
savings level, the observed savings choices follow a step function such as: 
(5)   𝑆!,! = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐 !!,!! ∗ 𝑃 
For example, suppose that the share price is $10, and an individual preference to save 
is $5, then level of savings observed in the data is $0 because that individual purchase zero 
shares. If instead, the latent savings preference is $27, the maximum number of shares that 
can be purchased is 2, and the level of savings observed is $20. Similarly if the latent 
savings is $100, the maximum number of shares that can be purchased in a session is 5, 
therefore, the maximum level of savings per meeting is constrained to $50. These 
individuals would be left censored, interval censored and right censored respectively. I use 
an interval regression model to estimate the unbiased parameters that measure the effect of 
the treatment interventions on saving using equation (6): 
 (6)   𝑆!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝜂! 
where each observation of 𝑆!,!  is an interval censored data, 𝑇!,!  is a dummy for 
private-labeling treated individuals and 𝑇!,! for public-labeling treated individuals. 𝜂! is an 
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idiosyncratic disturbance term. The results are shown in Table 6. The first panel shows the 
estimations for savings per meeting. The results are consistent with the findings in previous 
estimations. The effect of private-labeling treatment is insignificant, but the public-labeling 
treatment is significant in explaining savings. However, the significance level drops even 
for the public-labeling treatment when I cluster the data by VSLA.  
I estimate the model using number of shares purchased as dependent variable. The 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for both treatment 
interventions, indicating that labeling savings accounts privately and publicly increased the 
number of shares purchased by an average of 0.65 and 0.75 shares per meeting. See Panel 
B.77 The results from these estimations show that the treatment interventions are effective 
in motivating the purchase of more shares in each meeting, but only public commitment is 
able to explain changes in total savings. 
Next, I explore the situation of individuals in all experimental groups pre and post- 
treatment intervention. I look at the share prices, the number of shares purchased in the first 
meeting and the trends of savings over the entire savings cycle. The results show very 
interesting patterns. Figure 1a depicts trends of the number of shares purchased during the 
savings cycle by experimental groups. The graph shows that, on average, individuals 
purchase the same number of shares in the first meeting, regardless of the subsequent 
treatment status. But after the intervention, this number is increased for both private- and 
public-labeling treatment groups relative to the control. The increase is noticeable larger for 
the public-labeling treatment. After approximately meeting 9, public and private get closer 
                                                
77 I also estimated the interval regression model including interactions of number of meetings with treatment 
status for both savings per meeting and shares purchased per meeting; and also clustering by study site. The 
treatment effects are robust to those specifications. 
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together, reaching a similar level to those in the control group. These trends illustrate 
potential positive treatment effects on the number of shares purchased as a result of the 
interventions. For total savings, I plotted the cumulative savings for individuals during the 
savings cycle in Figure 1b. It shows that average total savings are consistently larger for 
those in the public-labeling treatment than those in the control group and private-labeling 
treatment intervention. The latter is the lowest amongst all. This does not necessarily 
implies that private commitment doesn’t work, but that there are other characteristics, such 
as the share price, that should be incorporated in the analysis before making any 
conclusions about individual savings behavior. For that reason, I need to do further analysis 
of the differences in share prices across VSLAs, as described below.  
Figure 2 plots the distribution of pre-treatment variables for each experimental group. 
Panel A illustrates the distribution of share prices in all savings groups. Recall that the first 
purchase of shares was performed prior to the interventions, which allows us to compare 
the pre-treatment situation across experimental groups. There is a high frequency in the 
price of shares at P = COP 5,000 (Colombian pesos, equivalent to approx. USD 2.8) across 
all groups. This provides an opportunity to compare treatment effects at this price, when 
individuals are more or less equally economically able to save. In the private-labeling 
treatment, there is large concentration of prices below COP 3,000 (approx. USD 1.66) 
relative to the other experimental groups, suggesting lower average share prices in this 
treatment group. Panel B presents the frequency of savings groups according to the number 
of shares bought only in the first meeting. The figure shows that on average individuals 
purchased up to 2 shares in the first meeting.  
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To explore further the statistical significance across experimental groups, I calculated 
the average values of these measures for treatment and control groups. Table 7 shows that 
the price of shares is statistically different for all experimental groups. The average share 
prices are USD 2.30, USD 1.90 and USD 2.18 in the control, private-labeling treatment and 
public-labeling treatment, respectively. This is consistent with what we observed in Figure 
2, where the price of shares of VSLAs in the private-treatment intervention was 
concentrated in lower values. Although these differences seem small, they are statistically 
different from zero. This creates an imbalance in the pre-treatment variables but does not 
invalidate the results, because as shown in Table 5, the results are mainly the same when I 
estimate ATE for individuals under the same conditions (P = COP 5,000). However, 
identifying these differences in prices helps to explain the sign of the private-labeling 
treatment estimates when I estimate total savings balances. Differences in the price of 
shares impose a restriction in the total amount of money saved throughout the savings 
cycle, because no one can purchase more than 5 shares in each meeting. Even if individuals 
in the private-labeling treatment purchase the maximum number of shares permitted in all 
meetings, total savings would be smaller in comparison to the control and public-labeling 
treatment groups, which have significantly higher share prices.  
In terms of average number of shares purchased during the first meeting, I do not 
observe any statistical difference across experimental groups. This indicates that, 
conditional on share prices, individuals have a similar ability to save, on average. The last 
rows of the table show statistically significant differences across experimental groups in the 
total number of shares purchased and total savings balances under different scenarios. 
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I also estimated the simple model that includes pre-treatment variables in the model in 
order to control for imbalances in the sample prior to the intervention. The model estimated 
is: 
(7)   𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝜸𝒊𝑿𝒊 + 𝜇!     
where 𝜸𝒊 is a vector of coefficients and 𝑿𝒊 a matrix of covariates, which include in the 
regression the  price of shares, dummies for facilitator and the number of shares purchased 
in the first meeting.78 Table 8 displays the results of estimating equation (7). Columns 1, 2 
and 3 show that estimating the total number of shares purchased in the savings cycle is 
robust to including different covariates as controls. However, the private-labeling treatment 
effect and the price of shares are insignificant. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show that controlling by 
the share price, the treatment effect for individuals in the public-labeling intervention is 
significant in explaining higher savings balances of about USD 18 more relative to the 
controls. Average total savings of individuals in the control group is USD 82.52. Thus, the 
point estimates predict an increase of 22% in total savings reaching out over USD 100 for 
the public-labeling treatment. Treatment effects for the private-labeling intervention are 
still insignificant but now the sign of the point estimates is positive. The results are similar 
across specifications.79 
                                                
78 I included dummies for facilitator in order to control whether they have any influence in the determination 
of share prices. The coefficient for 3 facilitators is significant, but for others, it is not statistically significant.  
79 The statistical difference in the share prices across experimental groups may indicate an imbalance in the 
pre-treatment characteristics of individuals. For that reason, I estimate the same model for total shares 
purchased and total savings balances in each meeting starting from the first meeting (pre-intervention) until 
meeting 7, for which I have disaggregated data. For the rest of the meetings (8 to end of cycle), I have 
detailed data on purchase of shares for two thirds of the sample. For the remaining, I don’t have detailed data 
per meeting but have the total number of shares purchased in the savings cycle. But all the individuals 
included in the analysis comply with the treatment status. The results are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The estimated treatment effects on the number of shares purchased are strong and significant for the public-
labeling treatment; and for the private-labeling treatment, the effects seem to be significant after some time of 
exposure of the intervention. Surprisingly, the treatment effects on total savings are not significant for either 
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To provide more evidence of the heterogeneity observed as a result of differences in 
ability to save and share prices, Figure 3 plots the average number of shares purchased in 
every meeting by experimental group and by the number of shares bought in the first 
meeting. Individuals that, prior to the intervention, were more economically constrained 
(purchased 0 to 2 shares in the first meeting) exhibited more difficulties to purchase a larger 
amount of shares during the savings cycle, regardless of the treatment intervention 
received, whereas those with more ability to save (purchased 3 to 5 shares prior to the 
intervention) were more responsive to the treatment interventions, indicating differential 
treatment effects for all types of individuals.80 As shown in the graphs, the trend in savings 
is larger for individuals in the public-labeling treatment in all meetings. These pictures 
provide evidence of potential heterogeneous treatment effects that I explore by estimating 
the following model: 
 (8)  𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑇!,! + 𝛿!𝑇!,! ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛿!𝑇!,! ∗𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝜁!     
where 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! represents a set of dummy variables of the number of shares 
purchased in the first meeting by each individual. Results are reported in Table 9 and in 
Table 10. Table 9 shows the coefficients of estimating equation (8) for the dependent 
variables: total number of shares and total savings balance during the savings cycle. As in 
the results for the first model the coefficients indicate that public-labeling treatment is very 
strong and effective in increasing savings for all individuals, but are mixed for individuals 
                                                                                                                                               
treatment intervention when I estimate the model meeting by meeting, implying that the price share is 
definitely an important factor in the causal effect of the treatment on the treated subjects.  
80 Despite that I don’t find any difference in the characteristics of these households across experimental 
groups, the term “economically constrained” is assigned to individuals exclusively based on the number of 
shares purchased prior to treatment. A more detailed analysis should be done to prove that these households 
are in fact more disadvantaged and, therefore, less able to save.  
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in the private-labeling intervention. In order to see this more clearly, I calculated the joint 
significance of the total treatment effects for each type of individuals. The computations 
suggest that the private-labeling intervention significantly increases savings accumulations 
for those who initially bought 3 or 5 shares. For all other types of individuals, the treatment 
effect is positive but insignificant. This result can be illustrated in a graph. Figure 4 depicts 
the heterogeneous treatment effects estimated above for the total number of shares 
purchased (left panel) and total savings in US dollars (right panel). The effect of public 
commitment on total shares bought during the savings cycle is strongly significant and 
increases monotonically for individuals that purchase 1 or more shares in the first meeting, 
whereas the impact of private commitment fluctuates along the different levels of ability to 
save; however it’s increasing and significant only for those that begin the savings cycle 
purchasing 3 or 5 shares. On the other hand, the public and private treatment interventions 
increase total savings but are significant only for individuals who, pre-intervention, are less 
economically constrained.  
The findings show that setting a soft commitment to save is highly effective in 
increasing savings accumulations for individuals without economic restrictions or with 
some ability or motivation to save, prior to the intervention. Yet, when adding peer affects 
to commitment, the economic restriction does not prevent all individuals from increasing 
savings accumulations. 
The institutional features of the program, such as the limit in the number of shares 
purchased in each meeting by each member or the fact that individuals can only purchase 
discrete amounts of shares, may be underestimating the true effects of the treatment on 
savings. In order to explore further this idea, I estimated a non-linear model in two steps: In 
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the first step, I estimate the probability of purchasing each discrete number of shares 
allowed in the first meeting (0 to 5) as a function of group variables (including dummies for 
city and facilitator). This estimation can be observed as an approximation to model the 
institutional constraints imposed by the program, and allows estimating the underlying 
savings of individuals. In the second step, I estimate the average treatment effects on 
savings accumulations, measured with various outcomes. The results are reported in Tables 
11 and 12. The estimations show that the decision of the number of shares to purchase in 
the first meeting is determined by group variables such as the value of the social fund and 
the municipality that also describes the facilitator of the VSLA. The facilitator plays an 
important role in determining the number of shares that participants purchase in the 
beginning of the savings cycle. Surprisingly, the share price is unrelated to this decision, at 
least in the first meeting. These results indicate that individuals make their choices 
following the dynamics of the group rather than their own, financial or behavioral, 
constraints, at least in the beginning.  
In the second step, I use the predicted probability of choosing 0 to 5 shares to purchase 
in the first meeting as a measure of the institutional constraints that participants may face 
when making the savings decisions. I estimate average treatment effects on savings 
accumulations controlling for other explanatory variables (see Table 12). The results are 
consistent with previous findings (Tables 5 and 8), where public commitment strongly 
affects the total number of shares purchased in the savings cycle with and without including 
the share prices a control. On the other hand, private commitment is positive but 
insignificant. Interestingly, the variables that measures the institutional constraints faced in 
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the VSLAs are positive and statistically significant in explaining all different measures of 
savings accumulations; and support the findings from previous estimations. 
 
Treatment effects on goal achievement: 
The last set of calculations exhibit the effects of the interventions on goal achievement. 
First, I calculated the impact on goal achievement using data from the baseline survey. At 
that point, I asked all subjects what they wanted to use their savings from the first savings 
cycle for. I compared this information with the responses from the follow-up survey. The 
results show that public commitment highly affects achievement. See Table 13. However, 
the impact is not statistical significant in the case of private commitment. This result is 
robust to all specifications, even when I condition the achievement of goals with the 
initially established goal and I add municipality level control. 
In the second estimation I estimate goal achievement, but now I compare the responses 
in the follow-up survey with the information reported at the intervention sessions. In other 
words, this specification compares the effect across treatments (excluding the control 
group). The coefficients are significant at the 5% and indicate an increase of 9.8 percentage 
points in the likelihood of goal achievement for individuals in the public-labeling treatment 
relative to those in the private-labeling treatment group.  
Qualitative results: 
The purpose of the qualitative analysis is to explore further the behavior of treated 
individuals after exposure of the intervention and to identify whether the interventions 
contributed somehow to the way participants earmarked transactions and, as a result, 
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change consumption and savings choices. I performed 4 focus groups discussions at two 
sites of the study and explored the experience of participants in the following: (i) savings as 
a member of VSLA, (ii) the savings goals, (iii) challenges in reaching goals, (iv) dynamics 
within VSLAs, and (v) social taxation among members of the group.  
Individuals reported that before being part of VSLAs their level of savings was very 
small, irregular, mostly informal and used frequently in unnecessary spending, despite of 
understanding that savings is a mechanism to reaching goals, smoothing consumption and 
facing difficult times in the future. Participants informed us that sharing publicly their 
savings goals created a competitive environment within the group that motivated each other 
to making greater effort to save a larger amount of money. In all cases individuals put 
pressure from one another to buy shares, actively participate in group activities and achieve 
commitments. In a few situations the group penalized members who were not making 
regular contributions.  
In terms of savings goals, men were more likely to set long run savings goals that 
required more funds and possibly other sources of funding than the savings from the group. 
Women set goals that were more feasible and easier to achieve, but were more like to reach 
those goals. The most common motivations to reaching goals were personal challenge, 
pressure from the VLSA members (mainly to purchase the maximum number of shares) 
and family-related goals (make it less likely to deviate). 
During the discussion sessions I found out evidence of social taxes in two contexts: 
First, individuals penalize VSLA members that failed to contribute to the savings fund or 
failed to comply with the rules of conduct. Second, at the household level I found that men 
usually tease their wives and underestimate their ability to save at the beginning of the 
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savings cycle; but once they realize their engagement with savings, husbands reduced the 
money transferred to their wives for household expenses because women are now able to 
raise money on their own. These statements provide some insights to study further the 
dynamic created at the household level as a result of changes in individual’s savings 
behavior. 
 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
I designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) to study how two 
modifications of a commitment savings product, in which individuals open private or 
publicly a ‘mental savings account’, affect savings decisions of low-income individuals that 
participate in newly formed VSLAs in Colombia. 
The results show that labeling ‘mental savings accounts’ is effective in increasing 
savings for different types of individuals. The RCT demonstrates very strong and 
significant results for treated individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings 
increased by more than 30 percentage points (effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) 
and individuals were at least 8.5% more likely to achieve the initially established savings 
goals. The results for the private-labeling treatment intervention are very interesting also. 
The effect on savings is heterogeneous and depends on intrinsic characteristics of 
individuals and on institutional restrictions imposed by the VSLA methodology. However, 
the impact on goal achievement is statistically irrelevant. 
The results also provide evidence that treatment effects are very significant for 
individuals who save larger amounts of money in the beginning of the VSLA savings cycle; 
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but are insignificant for individuals with lower savings in the beginning of the cycle. Using 
a model that estimates the underlying savings of individuals using an interval regression 
model and a 2-step procedure, I show that treatment effects are strong and significant for 
public-labeling treated subjects and insignificant for private-labeling subjects. Also, the 
models shows that the institutional constraints imposed by the methodology and 
characteristics of the savings groups affect the savings decisions of individuals. For that 
reason, individuals experience different abilities to respond to the treatment interventions 
depending not only on their own behavior but also on the institutional features of the VSLA 
program.  
In terms of goal achievement, individuals in the public-labeling treatment are more 
likely to use other sources of income flows, such as investments and loans to achieve 
savings goals. This could be explained by the fear to be punished by other members of the 
VSLA if they fail to meet their promises.  
Self-help groups such as VSLA are an alternative to poor and extremely poor 
households to help them manage financial assets and smooth consumption. Creating 
commitments exogenously enable individuals to think about strategies to improve the use 
of assets and financial decisions in the future in order to maximize their utility. This 
intervention translates recent theoretical insights into experimental strategies implemented 
in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve the impacts of a large-scale public 
policy program. The methodology represents a new approach to the study of individual 
behavior and provides valuable insights and information to program administrators and 
policy makers involved in the design and diffusion of commitment-savings products. The 
increased availability of these and other products with similar features may serve to 
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increase savings, improve financial literacy amongst poor households, which may 
contribute to generate income to fight poverty.  
The results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this study open additional 
questions that are subject of future research. Some ideas that arise form this study are: to 
explore how does the change in savings habits affect other behavior at the household and 
community level. Some potential outcomes to analyze are the bargaining power within the 
household, the participation in social and community activities, social penalties and 
rewards to savings behavior, etc. Also, further analysis should be done in terms of 
heterogeneous treatment effects for men vs. women, young vs. adults, and for long vs. short 
run commitments.  
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Table 1. Experimental sample 
 
Source: survey data, administrative records. Notes: The first panel contains the number of VSLAs that were 
subject of the experiment; the second shows the number of individuals exposed to the treatment intervention 
(recall that the control group is not exposed to the treatment intervention, but only to the VSLA methodology); 
panel 3 details the number of individuals randomly chosen to be interviewed to administered the households 
survey; and panel 4 summarizes the total number of individuals in the experimental sample and for which I 
have administrative records on savings. 
 
 
Table 2. Power calculations 
 
Note: Author’s calculations using a Multi-site cluster randomized model at the individual level with Optimal 
Design software. Results are verified using Stata commands sampsi and sampclus with savings data from the 
pilot of the VSLA program in Colombia. 
 
 
  
Bolivar Choco Cundi-Boyaca Total
Public 13 15 19 47
Private 13 15 17 45
Control 12 14 19 45
Total 38 44 55 137
Public 128 131 196 455
Private 139 135 174 448
Total 267 266 370 903
Public 65 73 91 229
Private 67 75 76 218
Control 57 70 96 223
Total 189 218 263 670
Public 143 179 256 578
Private 149 183 231 563
Control 104 166 252 522
Total 396 528 739 1663
Experimental groups 
(VSLA)
Treated Individuals
Experimental subjects 
(household survey)
Administrative data
Min. Observations Min. Clusters per site
Rho=0.05 702 6
Rho=0.15 819 7
Rho=0.25 1053 9
Rho=0.05 1287 11
Rho=0.15 1755 15
Rho=0.25 2223 19
Experiment 1. Public vs. Control, MDE = 0.3 sd
Experiment 2. Public vs. Private, MDE = 0.2 sd
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Table 3. Baseline comparison of covariates across experimental groups 
 
Source: Baseline household survey. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Table 4. Savings commitments 
 
Source: Treatment interventions. T-statistic calculated from the mean difference of averages between groups 
 
 
 
 Untreated Public Private Mean Diff Mean Diff Mean Diff 
 (CTRL) ( U ) ( R ) (CTRL-U) (CTRL-R) (R-U)
Household size 4.72 4.72 4.55 0.008 0.174 -0.166
% female 0.77 0.82 0.78 -0.053 -0.014 -0.039
Number of children (<16 yrs of age) at home 1.80 1.76 1.48 0.040 0.32** -0.28**
% married 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.038 0.046 -0.008
% CCT recipient 0.62 0.66 0.58 -0.034 0.043 -0.077*
% receive cash & in-kind transfers (elderly) 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.004 0.000 -0.003
% households that hold any type of savings 0.27 0.27 0.33 -0.008 -0.064 0.056
Weekly savings (USD) 7.1 6.4 5.4 0.750 1.750 -1.000
% households with a bank account 0.49 0.50 0.49 -0.014 0.000 -0.014
% open bank account to receive CCT 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.028 0.056 -0.028
% had loan in last year 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.006 0.037 -0.031
% households that write a budget 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.033 0.000 -0.033
% made an investment last year 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.036 0.055 -0.019
% with paid job 0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.029 0.036 -0.065
% independent 0.53 0.48 0.50 0.047 0.024 0.023
% own home 0.66 0.62 0.63 0.037 0.032 0.005
% participate in community organizations 0.09 0.11 0.14 -0.020 -0.049 0.029
Trust in banks and financial institutions 3.39 3.36 3.49 0.027 -0.106 0.134
Size of the VSLA 13.60 13.57 13.56 0.035 0.039 -0.004
Perception that household could save…:
     Much more 0.36 0.37 0.40 -0.008 -0.035 0.027
     More 0.32 0.36 0.32 -0.045 0.001 -0.046
     The same 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.073 0.056 0.017
     Nothing 0.16 0.18 0.18 -0.020 -0.022 0.002
Pearson's chi-squared 7.29 P-value: 0.29
Number of observations 223 229 218
Number of VSLAs 45 47 45
Savings goals Private-labeling Public-labeling
(percentages) Mean Mean t-statistic
Home 43 34 1.71
Education 25 22 0.53
Investment 28 25 0.64
Consumption of non-durables 8 16 -2.15
Consumption of durables 7 12 -1.47
Pay debt 1 2 -1.34
Unexpected expense 4 3 0.32
Other 2 3 0.33
Biweekly savings (No. of shares) 3.06 3.1 -0.24
Biweekly savings (USD) 5.94 6.93 -2.92
Would like to take a loan 15 10 2.22
Number of participants 448 455
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Table 5. Treatment effects on savings 
 
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 6. Interval regression results 
 
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
 
 
Table 7. Pre- and Post-treatment averages for savings outcomes 
 
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total
First 6 
meetings
p=COL 
$5,000 Total
First 6 
meetings
p=COL 
$5,000
Private tmt 6.03* 1.99* 8.12* -5.764 -2.07 22.55*
(3.45) (1.01) (4.5) (11.72) (4.05) (12.51)
Public tmt 12.35*** 3.26*** 11.19** 14.11 3.12 31.09**
(3.47) (1.113) (4.58) (11.19) (3.68) (12.71)
Constant 35.03*** 12.83*** 32.72*** 82.53*** 29.79*** 90.9***
(2.02) (.722) (1.9) (8.702) 2.96 (5.27)
Observations 1474 1474 654 1474 1474 654
Chi2 for (Public=Private) 10.76 8.46 7.85 0.18 0.02 7.85
Number of Shares Bought Savings Balance
Coef. Std. Err. Coef.
Private 0.02 (0.137) 0.02 (0.980)
Public 1.14 (0.133) *** 1.14 (0.919)
Constant 6.75 (0.096) *** 6.75 (0.767) ***
Observations
Coef. Std. Err. Coef.
Private 0.56 (0.059) *** 0.56 (0.322) *
Public 0.72 (0.058) *** 0.72 (0.343) **
Constant 2.27 (0.042) *** 2.27 (0.224) ***
Observations
A. Savings per meeting (USD)
B. Number of shares bought per meeting
19,555                                                             
19,555                                                             
Robust SE (VSLA)
Robust SE (VSLA)
Control (C) Private (R) Public (U) C-R C-U R-U
Share price (USD) 2.30 1.90 2.18 ***  * ***
Shares purchased first meeting 1.78 1.82 1.75
Total shares
All 35.03 41.06 47.39 *** *** ***
First 6 meetings 12.83 14.83 16.09 *** *** **
P = COL $5,000 32.72 40.84 43.92 *** ***
Total savings (USD)
All 82.53 76.76 96.64 *** ***
First 6 meetings 29.79 27.71 32.91 ** ***
P = COL $5,000 90.90 113.45 121.99 *** ***
 94 
Table 8. Treatment effects with controls 
 
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Specifications (2) and (5) include facilitator dummies as controls. All regressions also include dummies for 
municipalities or study sites.  
 
 
Table 9. Heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
Source: Administrative data. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private tmt 5.11 4.92 5.08 7.91 8.49 7.85
(3.49) (3.37) (3.33) (7.05) (7.11) (6.68)
Public tmt 12.15*** 11.28** 12.39*** 18.12* 18.43* 18.64*
(3.41) (3.417) (3.25) (8.67) (8.44) (8.26)
Share price -2.30 0.19 -1.81 34.23*** 37.64*** 35.24***
(1.71) (1.83) (1.549) (6.03) (7.24) (5.74)
Shares meeting 1 6.70*** 13.78***
(.58) (1.418)
Constant 40.32*** 32.51*** 27.24*** 3.92 -6.1 -22.96
(4.53) (6.09) (4.11) (13.35) (15.06) (12.58)
Includes facilitator dummies X X
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474
Chi2 for (Public=Private) 8.81          8.00          9.45          3.76         4.10         4.08         
Dependent variable:
Total shares Total savings balance
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Private tmt -2.231 (3.49) -4.464 (6.95)
Public tmt 7.689* (3.22) 10.3 (7.75)
Private tmt*1 share dummy 0.221 (3.37) -0.485 (7.47)
Private tmt*2 shares dummy 5.892* (2.9) 12.19* (5.13)
Private tmt*3 shares dummy 21.44*** (5.95) 30.85*** (8.85)
Private tmt*4 shares dummy 9.652* (4.09) 13.38 (7.72)
Private tmt*5 shares dummy 32.61*** (5.95) 57.97*** (11.57)
Public tmt*1 share dummy -6.413* (2.69) -16.66** (6.29)
Public tmt*2 shares dummy 6.498 (3.8) 15.71 (8.78)
Public tmt*3 shares dummy 18.53** (5.48) 38.04** (12.18)
Public tmt*4 shares dummy 29.81*** (7.13) 82.17*** (20.64)
Public tmt*5 shares dummy 30.05*** (2.99) 59.14*** (9.8)
Share price (USD) -1.3806 (1.39) 28.92*** (7.21)
Avge share first meeting 3.262* (1.44)
Avge savings (USD) 4.471* (1.95)
Constant 32.39*** (4.8) -1.949 (10.31)
Number of observations 1474 1474
Total shares Total savings
Dependent variable
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Table 10. Total heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
Source: Administrative data. Joint significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  
Notes: ^ These numbers are calculated using the coefficients from estimating the heterogeneous treatment 
effects from model 2. Robust standard errors are used in the estimation. 
 
 
Table 11. Step 1: Ordered probit to estimate the probability of purchasing a discrete 
number of shares in the first meeting 
 
Notes: * indicates significance level at the 90%, ** at the 95% and *** at the 99%. In total, the experiment 
was conducted in 9 municipalities with one facilitator per location. However, in Cartagena there were 4 
facilitators in total. The table shows the facilitator effect on the probability of purchasing 0 through 5 shares 
in the first meeting as well as the effect of other group variables. Facilitator 10 is omitted. 
0 shares in first meeting
1 share in first meeting
2 shares in first meeting
3 shares in first meeting
4 shares in first meeting
5 shares in first meeting
0 shares in first meeting 27.7 37.7 ** 69.3 84.1
1 share in first meeting 26.6 29.9 *** 61.2 59.8
2 shares in first meeting 41.4 51.9 *** 97.8 116.1 **
3 shares in first meeting 62.3 *** 69.4 *** 132.3 *** 154.2 ***
4 shares in first meeting 49.1 79.2 *** 121.8 205.3 ***
5 shares in first meeting 81.1 *** 88.4 *** 154.8 *** 170.8 ***
Public
41.7 112.8
50.7 101.3
Total effects^ Total shares Total savings (USD)
Private Public Private
28.6 66.2
37.7 90.1
43.1 105.9
Mean for Control group Total shares Total savings (USD)
30.0 73.8
Depvar: Shares bought in first meeting (0 to 5) Std. Err.
Size of savings group 0.02 (0.015)
% female in the group 0.07 (0.063)
Share price (USD) 0.00 (0.000)
Value of social fund (USD) 0.00 ** (0.000)
Facilitator 2 (Istmina) -0.30 (0.208)
Facilitator 3 (Pacho) -0.20 (0.175)
Facilitator 4 (Quibdo) -0.44 ** (0.201)
Facilitator 5 (Sogamoso) -0.63 *** (0.186)
Facilitator 6 (Tado) -0.23 (0.275)
Facilitator 7 (Ubate) -0.01 (0.203)
Facilitator 8 (Zipaquira) -0.19 (0.216)
Facilitator 9 (Cartagena) -0.06 (0.236)
Facilitator 10 (Cartagena) -0.29 (0.279)
Facilitator 11 (Cartagena) -0.48 ** (0.206)
Facilitator 12 (Cartagena) -0.53 * (0.283)
Cut 1 -0.70 (0.250)
Cut 2 0.30 (0.244)
Cut 3 0.84 (0.249)
Cut 4 1.06 (0.246)
Cut 5 1.29 (0.249)
Observations 1,474              
Coefficient
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Table 12. Step 2: Treatment effects on savings accumulations with and without controls 
 
Notes: * indicates significance level at the 90%, ** at the 95% and *** at the 99%. 
 
 
Table 13. Treatment effects on goal achievement 
 
Source: Baseline and end line household survey. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  I use Baseline 
goals as controls 
 
 
  
Average shares per 
meeting Total shares
Total savings 
(USD)
Private treatment 0.28 4.96 7.63
(0.203) (3.362) (6.819)
Public treatment 0.54* 12.44*** 18.81*
(0.234) (3.242) (8.232)
Residual -0.20 -2.44 -5.67
(0.122) (1.740) (4.390)
Residual^2 0.06* 0.78* 1.48
(0.023) (0.314) (0.772)
Shares bought in meeting 1 0.53*** 7.95*** 16.96***
(0.132) (1.868) (4.768)
Share price (USD) -0.07 -1.58 35.67***
(0.100) (1.512) (5.643)
Constant 1.40*** 22.99*** -32.51*
(0.308) (4.997) (13.050)
Observations 1,107                     1,474                1,474                    
Chi2 (private=public) 4.83 9.06 3.89
Chi2 (all) 32.7 38.86 31.25
Goal achievement
depvar: Public Private Public Private
Achieved savings goal (BL) 0.159             0.085** 0.013     0.098*** 0.032        
-(0.04) -(0.04) -(0.04) -(0.04)
Achieved savings goal (TMT)  0.098*** 0.064        
-(0.05) -(0.05)
Mean control
Robust SE Robust SE + controls
Number of observations 670
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Figure 1a. Trend of the number of share purchased over the entire savings cycle 
 
Source: Administrative data.  
 
Figure 1b. Cumulative total savings per meeting by experimental group 
 
Source: Administrative data.  
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Figure 2.a. Pre-treatment variables: Share prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Administrative data. 
 
 
Figure 2.a. Pre-treatment variables: Shares bought in first meeting 
 
Source: Administrative data. 
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Figure 3. Trends of shares purchased in each meeting by number of shares bought in the 
first meeting 
 
Source: Administrative data.  
 
 
Figure 4. Total heterogeneous effects on savings 
 
Source: Administrative data. The data plotted corresponds to the coefficients of the heterogeneous treatment 
effects. 
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Appendix A1. Treatment effects estimated for each meeting 
 
Notes: * indicates significance level at the 90%, ** at the 95% and *** at the 99%. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. I estimated each regression until meeting 7 because I only have detailed information about the 
number of shares bought per person per meeting for the entire sample until meeting 7. After meeting 7, I only 
have data for one third of the sample. 
 
 
  
Private TMT Public TMT Obs.
Meeting 1 0.034 -0.028 1.784 *** -0.595 -0.361 4.044 *** 1474
(0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.58) (0.49) (0.38)
Meeting 2 0.191 0.697 *** 2.100 *** -0.724 0.793 4.942 *** 1474
(0.18) (0.20) (0.14) (0.61) (0.61) (0.49)
Meeting 3 0.410 ** 0.794 *** 2.166 *** -0.235 0.882 5.143 *** 1474
(0.20) (0.24) (0.16) (0.80) (0.74) (0.59)
Meeting 4 0.326 0.611 ** 2.323 *** -0.536 0.727 5.295 *** 1474
(0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.73) (0.72) (0.59)
Meeting 5 0.326 0.577 ** 2.262 *** -0.285 0.443 5.271 *** 1474
(0.21) (0.22) (0.14) (0.84) (0.72) (0.59)
Meeting 6 0.709 *** 0.606 *** 2.199 *** 0.303 0.638 5.092 *** 1474
(0.23) (0.23) (0.17) (0.84) (0.76) (0.64)
Meeting 7 0.550 ** 0.618 ** 2.155 *** -0.124 0.630 5.218 *** 1474
(0.25) (0.24) (0.17) (0.84) (0.83) (0.66)
Total shares Total savings (USD)
Private TMT Public TMT Constant Constant
Regression 
for:
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Chapter 5: Does saving more help people make 
better choices? Experimental evidence from VSLAs 
in Colombia 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Although saving behavior of individuals has been studied widely in the economics 
literature, the main concern of researchers has been to illustrate the factors that determine 
savings and how to increase savings behavior among individuals as a strategy to smooth 
consumption over time. According to Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis, individuals save 
to maintain a stable and relatively constant level of consumption over their entire lifetime. 
These studies have tested the determinants of savings using individual as well as 
aggregated data.81  
However, little evidence has been offered about the relationship of savings and 
variables that measure other types of behavior. Most studies analyze the effects of savings 
on aggregate variables such as economic growth. In an attempt to provide signals on the 
causality of savings on individual behavior, this essay uses experimental evidence about 
how a saving-promoting intervention may affect individual behavior such as bargaining 
power in the household, changes in the composition of households’ expenditures, food 
security, trust and perception. 
The results offer some suggestions that help answer questions and concerns such as 
why do policymakers and researchers care about people's preferences for consumption? Or 
                                                
81 See Modigliani (1966), Carroll et al (1994), Deaton (2005) and Guven (2012). 
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why do we want to help individuals save more or to participate more in the decisions in the 
household? Or as in Thaler & Sunstein´s “libertarian paternalism” discussion, why we want 
to push individuals into certain directions to help them make better decisions?82  
In this essay, I address part of these questions by providing evidence of behavioral 
changes of individuals that participate in a Randomized Controlled Trial in which 
participants label mental savings accounts created in two different settings. First, they set a 
savings goal and label their Village Saving and Loan Association (VSLA) savings account 
in a private or individual setting. Second, individuals label their VSLA savings account 
individually, but then publicly announce to other members of the group their savings goal. 
This intervention starts with a trust building game that motivates cooperative behavior.83 In 
this way individuals create private and public commitments to reaching savings goals. I 
also observe and follow a control group in which individuals participate in VSLAs during 
the same period of time, but do not set explicitly any savings goal. The hypothesis tested by 
under this setting is whether individuals save more when they save for a, private or public, 
declared purpose, and if this pro-savings behavior is influences the change in other 
behaviors. 
In the paper Public vs. Private Mental Accounts: Experimental Evidence from Savings 
Groups in Colombia I provide evidence about the impact of labeling mental savings 
accounts on savings for individuals that participate in VSLAs.84 In this essay, I want to test 
whether this savings-promoting intervention has an impact on other outcomes that describe 
                                                
82 Thaler and Sunstein (2009). 
83 The game is called “Game with balloons” in which each member of a VSLA is asked to maintain a balloon 
in the air while everybody is walking around a room. Then more balloons are added and all participants are 
responsible for keeping all balloons in the air, regardless of whether its their own balloon or of another 
member. 
84 Salas (2014).  
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the behavior of individuals in the decision-making or bargaining power in within the 
household, expenditures, food security, trust, etc. I explore various measures of these 
variables in the analysis using data collected from household surveys conducted in the RCT 
at two points in time. During the baseline, I collected demographic characteristics of the 
households, as well as data on income, expenditures, experience with financial services, 
trust and general perception in different hypothetical situations. One year after the 
treatment intervention, I followed the same individuals and collected data in order to 
explore changes in savings and other outcomes after being exposed to the intervention for 
at least one savings cycle (8 months). 
Using measures of different behaviors the results show that labeling savings accounts 
are an effective strategy to improve discretionary spending in some household 
expenditures, trust and perception; but is unable to change the bargaining power within the 
household or improve food security of adults and children. Some of this may have a direct 
relationship with a change in savings behavior that was obtained in Salas 2014. However, it 
is not possible to unravel if the change in individuals’ behavior is the result of the treatment 
intervention by itself or through savings. The test in this paper was motivated by anecdotal 
evidence shared by participants in focus group discussions that I held during the RCT. In 
those sessions, participants shared their experience in the savings group and with their 
families at home during the period of the study.  
On the other hand, the dynamics created in the savings groups also motivates exploring 
behavioral changes of those who participate and may reinforce the effect of the treatment 
interventions, in particular the public commitment. This is, the collective nature of the 
VSLA methodology may imply that individuals have the opportunity to know each other, 
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share their dreams, etc. For example, sharing their savings goals with each other creates 
social pressure that make individuals behave in different ways. 
 
5.2. DOES LABELING A SAVINGS ACCOUNT STIMULATE CHANGES IN 
OTHER BEHAVIORS? 
To answer his question, I estimate an OLS regression to test the direct impact of the 
treatment interventions on different outcomes of interest, using the following equation:  
(1)                𝑦! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛼!𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐! + 𝜖! 
where 𝑦! is the outcome variable that represents different behaviors such as trust, 
decision-making in the household, discretionary spending, etc. The variables Private and 
Public are dummies that measure participation in the private and public labeling treatment 
interventions, respectively; 𝛼!  and 𝛼!  measure the impact of each intervention on the 
variable of interest 𝑦!; and 𝜖! is the individual’s exogenous unobserved variation in the 
model.  
This model allows testing if different savings-promoting interventions have an impact 
on changes in the behavior of individuals related with inter-temporal decision-making.  
 
5.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Data:  
During July of 2011 to December of 2012 I implemented an RCT in which I randomly 
assigned newly formed VSLAs to two treatments and one control group in 9 municipalities 
of Colombia to test whether different ways in which individuals label their mental savings 
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accounts, affect savings accumulations.85 In this essay I use various sources of data 
collected in the RCT. I use data from a baseline survey administered to 670 households in 
the experimental sample. This survey measures a set of individual and household 
characteristics such as demographic variables, use and experience of financial services, 
food security, household income and expenditures, social capital, ability to cope with 
unexpected shocks, etc. 
The second-stage surveying was administered one year later, when I followed the same 
group of individuals interviewed at baseline. Attrition rate was less than 3% of the 
sample.86 Finally, I use administrative records of the program that collect information on 
savings in each of the meetings of VSLA members.87 I match these records with individual 
and household characteristics from baseline and follow-up in order to estimate the effect of 
private and public commitments on several individuals’ conduct outcomes. 
Treatment interventions: 
VSLAs are informal community-based arrangements that promote savings and provide 
access to low-cost loans for low-income individuals. In 2011, the Colombian government 
decided to expand the program to conform at least 600 new VSLAs in different regions of 
the country. I used this expansion to run an RCT and test whether labeling savings accounts 
in different contexts has an impact on savings behavior of participants. The RCT assigned 
newly formed VSLAs to three experimental groups and all individuals in a VSLA received 
the same intervention to its peers at the same VSLA: (i) Individuals in the control group are 
                                                
85 For more details on this study, go to http://luzsalas.ws.gc.cuny.edu/files/2014/03/JMPaper-v.5.pdf. 
86 In total, 19 individuals were not possible to interview during follow-up: 16 from the control group and 9 
from the private-labeling treatment group.  
87 Administrative data comes from two sources: IED/Vital and Plan International which are the implementing 
organizations of the VSLAs in Colombia. 
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exposed to the standard VSLA model which uses a well-scripted model to organize eligible 
beneficiaries, and allows individuals to save and borrow for any group-approved purpose. 
(ii) Individuals in the private-labeling treatment group are subject to an added discussion 
module aimed at highlighting and discussing the difficulties of committing to a savings 
path and the potential role of using mental accounts in strengthening those commitments. 
The session ended by asking members to voluntarily state in writing a savings purpose and 
weekly savings goals. In the private-labeling treatment individuals create (open) and label 
their mental “savings” account that may contribute to higher savings rates. (iii) The public-
labeling treatment intervention is similar except that it encouraged members to make 
commitments both to themselves and to others in their group, which may let me explore the 
possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. This module starts with trust-building 
games and a guided conversation aimed at highlighting the achievements of group 
commitments.88 As in the private-labeling treatment, members were asked to voluntarily 
state a savings purpose and a weekly savings goal in writing, but in this intervention those 
commitments were also shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals 
explicitly label their mental account and publicly commit to their own decision.  
As explained in Salas (2014), people often find it valuable and practical to form mental 
accounts as a commitment device to constrain their behavior; therefore, individuals may 
save more money when they save for a declared purpose. In addition, at the same time that 
savings behavior is changed, these interventions may affect the behavior of individuals 
when making other decisions. This is the case when individuals change their consumption 
patterns and decide to spend less in the consumption of temptation goods or decide to use 
                                                
88 The footnote 3 above explains the trust-building game performed in the public-labeling intervention. 
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their time to participate more in community organizations or in deciding whether to send 
children to school or to work, etc. From the public policy perspective studying changes in 
these behaviors could be useful in terms of designing interventions to improve the welfare 
of individuals and the dynamics in their households and communities.  
Outcome variables: 
I selected a set of variables to estimate behavioral changes of individuals that 
participated in the study (Salas, 2014) that can be classified in the following topics: (i) 
household decision-making, (ii) unnecessary spending; (iii) food security; (iv) occupation 
and job related variables; (v) social capital (trust and perception). I constructed different 
measures for each of these topics.  
Although these survey questions are commonly used in many studies, some of them 
can be measured incorrectly or are subject to common survey problems such as ambiguity, 
subjectivity, etc. Without this limitation, I would have been able to calculate unbiased 
estimates of the variables that measure the change in behavior of individuals as a result of 
being exposed to private or public commitment. 
i. Household decision-making: measures whether the respondent participates in making 
most of the decisions in the household during follow-up relative to her participation 
at baseline.89  
ii. Unnecessary spending: I used subjective and objective measures of unnecessary 
spending. First, during the follow-up survey I asked respondents if they believed 
                                                
89 The questions asks who makes most of the decisions in the household regarding regular spending, other 
spending, social events and celebrations, saving, investment, children expenditures and other expenditures. I 
collapsed these indicators into a single variable that calculates the number of decisions in which she 
participates. (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013). 
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their household expenditure in unnecessary consumption goods improved or worsen 
(subjective). Second, I asked individuals at baseline and follow-up surveys to list the 
items that the household spent more than necessary (fast food, tea, coffee, 
entertainment, groceries, utility bills, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, social events, 
debt, clothing, etc.). I classified the responses in dummy variables for each spending 
category and then compared their responses at each point in time.90  
iii. Food security: I use an aggregated measure of food insecurity if an individual lives 
in a household that had any type of problems getting enough food in the 30 days 
prior to the survey. If the household does not have the same problem during follow-
up, the indicator variable improves food insecurity takes the value of 1. I also use 
measures of improvement in food insecurity for adults and children.91  
iv. Social capital: I use a series of questions typically asked about trust in other 
individuals and institutions.92 In a scale from 1 to 5, respondents have to rate their 
level of trust in each category. I use this information to construct two types of 
indicators: I demean the response of individuals after exposure of treatment 
intervention for each category and construct a measure of trust for each one. Second, 
I compare the level of trust of individuals before and after intervention and report 
whether individuals are more trusting in each category. The regression results only 
illustrate the estimations with the first set of indicators. But the results are available 
                                                
90 For example, if an individual at baseline considered that the household spent more than necessary in fast 
food the dummy for unnecessary spending of fast food takes a value of 1. If at follow-up respond that didn’t 
spend more than necessary, the dummy takes the value of cero. Then when I compare these two dummy 
indicators, the variable improved in unnecessary spending takes the value of 1. 
91 The questions asked in the survey are: In the last 30 days, did any adult in your household had to reduce the 
amount of food or number of meals a day because didn´t have of enough money? And, In the last 30 days, did 
any child in your household had to reduce the amount of food or number of meals a day because didn´t have 
of enough money? 
92 See Glaeser et al (2000). 
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upon request. To measure perception, I use various questions about the general 
perception of fairness, cooperation and trustfulness of people in general, happiness 
and safety in their neighborhood and the general situation of their families. 93 
 
5.4. RESULTS 
Table 1 summarizes the OLS estimates of model (1). Each row represents the 
regression estimations for each single outcome variable. Columns 1, 3 and 5 display the 
OLS coefficients of the private, public treatment and constant, respectively, and columns 2, 
4, and 6 show the robust standard errors. The last column presents the number of 
observations of each regression. I grouped the variables of interest in 5 panels.   
Panel A shows the results for the outcomes that measure trust. Commitment to a 
particular savings purpose in a VSLA context increases the level of trust in relatives and 
friends. In particular, the coefficient of the private-labeling treatment is statistically 
significant (at 5% level) in explaining an increase in 0.54 points the level of trust in friends 
(in a scale from 1 to 5) in comparison with those individuals in the control group. Also, 
increases significantly the level of trust in the school system by 0.26 points. 
On the other hand, if individuals share public their savings goal, the level of trust in 
relatives (extended family) increases in about 0.52 points and its is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. Interestingly, public-labeling intervention also affects significantly the 
trust in community organizations, but the sign of the coefficient is negative, possibly 
because these savings groups are managed and organized by community members such as 
friends and neighbors, and the more cooperative behavior built in VSLAs may drive 
                                                
93 The set of questions about trust and perception are taken from the General Society Survey (GSS) and the 
World Values Survey (WVS), which are commonly used in economics research to measure social capital.  
 110 
members to be more aware of the duties and responsibilities of community organizations 
and demand more out of them. 
All other measures of trust in people and institutions such as the police, the 
government and financial institutions are not statistically affected by the treatment 
interventions.  
In terms of general perception I find that those individuals exposed to the public-
labeling treatment are on average 9.6% and 8.4% happier and feel safer in their 
neighborhoods, respectively, than those in the control group. But other measures such as 
the perception that the family is better off than at baseline and that people are in general 
more fair, cooperative or can be trusted is unaffected by the treatment interventions. Private 
labeling does not have any effect on any measure of perception (see Panel B). 
Another behavior that is evaluated in this essay is whether individuals participate more 
or less in a set of decisions within their household such as savings, investments, attend 
social events, and different types of expenditures. The results in Panel C show that the 
private and public-labeling interventions are ineffective in changing the participation of 
individuals in the decision-making within their households during the period of study. 
However, the public treatment is significant and increases average participation of VSLA 
members in deciding to attend social events by 8.1%. 
In Panel D I present the estimations for the variables that represent the reduction in 
discretionary spending. After approximately one year of exposure to the public-labeling 
treatment, individuals improve overall discretionary spending by about 10 percentage 
points. This point estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. The purchase of 
lottery tickets is an expenditure that is affected significantly by private and public treatment 
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interventions. As shown in Panel D, unnecessary or discretionary spending in other items is 
unaffected by the treatment status. Lastly, I find no effects of the pro-savings treatment 
interventions on changes in food intake for adults or children in the households. Although 
this problem is persistent during follow-up, there are no differences across individuals in 
the experimental groups.  
 
5.5. CONCLUSION 
This essay describes how two pro-savings interventions stimulate behavioral changes 
in various outcomes of individuals that participate in an RCT that took place in nine 
villages in Colombia. Members of VSLAs define labels to their VSLA savings account 
privately and publicly, creating private and public commitments to themselves and to other 
members of the savings groups, respectively.  
Using data from household surveys I demonstrate that the treatment interventions have 
an effect in some behavioral changes of participants after one year after being exposed to 
the interventions.  In particular, I find an increase in the level of trust in friends and in the 
school system when individuals set up individual or private commitments; an increase in 
the level of trust in relatives when the commitment is made public and a reduction in trust 
in community organizations. Also, public commitment makes people feel more safe and 
happy in their neighborhoods, as well as improving unnecessary or discretionary spending, 
especially the purchase of lottery, and in the decisions to attend social events in the family. 
But the treatment interventions are statistically silent in changing the participation in the 
households’ decision-making. In other words, the bargaining power in the household is 
unaffected by treatment status. Similarly, the effect on food security is not significant, not 
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as a result of better nutrition, but because the problems of food intake are experienced 
similarly across experimental groups.  
From a policy perspective, designing interventions able to produce changes in 
individual behavior is a powerful tool to improve the wellbeing of individuals. The results 
are conservative in explaining the causal relationship between pro-savings interventions 
and other behaviors. One question that arises from these findings is why do we care about 
people's preferences for consumption? Why do we want to help them save more? This 
evidence could be supportive in demonstrating the importance of savings on the decisions 
of individuals. However, more data and analysis is necessary to disentangle the mechanism 
by which these types of interventions affect the behavioral changes; if it’s through the 
change in savings behavior or directly as a result of the interventions. 
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Table 1. OLS regressions of outcome variables on treatment status 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. Outcome variables are listed vertically in each row. The first two columns show the 
estimation coefficients and robust standard errors for the private-labeling treatment intervention status; 
columns 3 and 4 show coefficients and robust standard errors for the public-labeling treatment intervention 
status; columns 5 and 6 show coefficients and robust standard errors for the constant term. The last column 
shows the number of observations for each regression. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE Observations
Close relatives 0.082 (0.130) 0.181 (0.130) -0.09 (0.100) 536
Other relatives 0.384 (0.250) 0.517 (0.211)* -0.312 (0.160) 188
Friends 0.543 (0.205)** 0.009 (0.198) -0.307 (0.149)** 301
VSLA members -0.079 (0.150) -0.03 (0.150) 0.04 (0.100) 436
Neighbors 0.197 (0.269) -0.163 (0.157) -0.180 (0.101)* 187
Banks and financial institutions 0.203 (0.177) -0.074 (0.164) -0.127 (0.125) 486
School system 0.261 (0.148)* 0.174 (0.152) -0.168 (0.112) 598
Government 0.232 (0.140) 0.04 (0.140) -0.09 (0.100) 434
Community organizations 0.167 (0.110) -0.23 (0.093)* 0.025 (0.060) 552
Police 0.198 (0.150) -0.008 (0.140) -0.062 (0.100) 434
More happy in neighborhood 0.063 (0.040) 0.096 (0.039)* 0.184 (0.035)*** 649
Feel more safe in neighborhood 0.019 (0.040) 0.084 (0.035)* 0.145 (0.033)*** 649
Your family is better off than at BL 0.046 (0.060) 0.113 (0.060) 0.275 (0.036)*** 649
Think that most people are fair 0.005 (0.050) 0.034 (0.050) 0.237 (0.033)*** 647
Think that most people are cooperative 0.010 (0.054) -0.041 (0.047) 0.186 (0.039)*** 645
Think that most people can be trusted -0.011 (0.057) -0.007 (0.067) 0.302 (0.043) 649
Overall decisions 0.019 (0.050) -0.025 (0.050) 0.169 (0.037)** 649
Savings decisions 0.023 (0.040) 0.045 (0.040) 0.126 (0.024)** 651
Attending social events 0.047 (0.040) 0.081 (0.040)* 0.111 (0.023)** 651
Regular spending 0.019 (0.030) 0.032 (0.040) 0.121 (0.024)** 651
Other household spending 0.009 (0.040) 0.04 (0.040) 0.126 (0.023)** 651
Expenditures for children 0.004 (0.040) 0.039 (0.040) 0.135 (0.026)** 651
Investment decisions 0.019 (0.030) 0.067 (0.040) 0.116 (0.024)** 651
Improve discretionary spending 0.066 (0.040) 0.099 (0.044)* 0.106 (0.024)** 651
Reduction in the spending of:
Lottery 0.041 (0.020)* 0.055 (0.023)* 0.019 (0.009)* 651
Alcoholic beverages 0.031 (0.020) 0.019 (0.020) 0.029 (0.011)** 651
Grocery shopping 0.039 (0.080) 0.048 (0.070) 0.454 (0.055)** 651
Utilities -0.018 (0.050) -0.017 (0.050) 0.227 (0.036)** 651
Debt 0.059 (0.030) -0.004 (0.020) 0.043 (0.016)** 651
Clothing 0.003 (0.020) -0.005 (0.030) 0.048 (0.016)** 651
Temptation goods 0.053 (0.030) 0.011 (0.030) 0.063 (0.019)** 651
Improved food intake in household 0.061 (0.035) -0.005 (0.033) 0.101 (0.022)** 651
Improved food security of adults 0.024 (0.033) -0.031 (0.031) 0.097 (0.024)** 651
Improved food security of children -0.003 (0.027) -0.024 (0.022) 0.068 (0.017)** 651
E. Food security
A. Trust
B. Perception
Dependent variable:
ConstantPublicPrivate
C. More bargaining power in household
D. Discretionary spending
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Chapter 6 
6. CONCLUSION 
I designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) to study how two 
modifications of a commitment savings product, in which individuals open private or publicly a 
‘mental savings account’, affect savings and other decisions of low-income individuals that 
participate in VSLAs in Colombia. 
The results show that labeling ‘mental savings accounts’ is effective in increasing savings for 
different types of individuals. The RCT demonstrates very strong and significant results for treated 
individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by more than 30 percentage points 
(effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were at least 8.5% more likely to 
achieve the initially established savings goals. The results for the private-labeling treatment 
intervention are very interesting also. The effect on savings is heterogeneous and depends on 
intrinsic characteristics of individuals and on institutional restrictions imposed by the VSLA 
methodology. However, the impact on goal achievement is statistically irrelevant. 
The results also provide evidence that treatment effects are very significant for individuals 
who save larger amounts of money in the beginning of the VSLA savings cycle; but are 
insignificant for individuals with lower savings in the beginning of the cycle. Using a model that 
estimates the underlying savings of individuals using an interval regression model and a 2-step 
procedure, I show that treatment effects are strong and significant for public-labeling treated 
subjects and insignificant for private-labeling subjects. Also, the models shows that the institutional 
constraints imposed by the methodology and characteristics of the savings groups affect the savings 
decisions of individuals. For that reason, individuals experience different abilities to respond to the 
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treatment interventions depending not only on their own behavior but also on the institutional 
features of the VSLA program.  
In terms of goal achievement, individuals in the public-labeling treatment are more likely to 
use other sources of income flows, such as investments and loans to achieve savings goals. This 
could be explained by the fear to be punished by other members of the VSLA if they fail to meet 
their promises.  
Self-help groups such as VSLA are an alternative to poor and extremely poor households to 
help them manage financial assets and smooth consumption. Creating commitments exogenously 
enable individuals to think about strategies to improve the use of assets and financial decisions in 
the future in order to maximize their utility. This intervention translates recent theoretical insights 
into experimental strategies implemented in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve 
the impacts of a large-scale public policy program. The methodology represents a new approach to 
the study of individual behavior and provides valuable insights and information to program 
administrators and policy makers involved in the design and diffusion of commitment-savings 
products. The increased availability of these and other products with similar features may serve to 
increase savings, improve financial literacy amongst poor households, which may contribute to 
generate income to fight poverty.  
In Chapter 1 I find that VSLA members are individuals that are above or in the upper limit of 
the poverty line. Although the target population for the program is poor and extremely poor 
households, the self-selection component of the methodology of the program make it hard to 
motivate poor and extremely poor individuals to participate in the program.  
I compare the situation of these households with what is observe at the national level (total 
average, urban and rural averages) using information collected in the first wave of the Colombian 
Longitudinal Survey of Wealth, Income, Labor and Land (ELCA) in 2010. In many variables of 
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interest, the situation of the VSLA households is comparable with those at the national level. This 
information provides a reference point for the readers of the types of households that join a VSLA.  
Financial inclusion via informal arrangements may be the first step towards a change in 
financial behavior. Practitioners and policy makers should put some attention to designing or 
offering innovative products that are consistent with the heterogeneity and the needs of different 
types of population. Formal banking is key to helping vulnerable households to manage and 
accumulate assets. However, in many cases the existing supply of products and programs is 
inconvenient and does not match the demand or at least does not provide enough motivation for 
individuals to change their behavior toward savings.  
Motivated by the results from the first two chapters and from qualitative analysis, I also 
explored how the implementation of pro-savings interventions such as labeling mental accounts 
would lead to changes in the behavior and decision-making of participants.   
Using data from household surveys I demonstrate that the treatment interventions increase the 
level of trust in friends and in the school system when individuals set up individual or private 
commitments; an increase in the level of trust in relatives when the commitment is made public and 
a reduction in trust in community organizations. Also changed the participant’s perceptions of 
happiness and safety in their neighborhoods and led to reductions in discretionary spending.  
From a policy perspective, designing these types of interventions may be a powerful tool to 
improve the wellbeing of individuals. This evidence is supportive in demonstrating the importance 
of savings on the decisions of individuals. However, more data and analysis is necessary to 
disentangle the mechanism by which these types of interventions affect the behavioral changes; if 
it’s through the change in savings behavior or directly as a result of the interventions. 
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